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Pandora's Box: Slave Character on Trial
in the Antebellum Deep South
Ariela Gross*
INTRODUCTION
Jurists in the antebellum American South considered slaves to have
the "double character of person and property" under the law, which
generally meant that slaves were persons when accused of a crime,
and property the rest of the time.' Indeed, when slave buyers felt
their newly acquired human property to be "defective" physically or
morally, they sued the sellers for breach of warranty-just as they
* I want to thank Robert Gordon, Janet Halley, George Fredrickson, Paul Finkelman,
Winthrop Jordan, Samuel Gross, Thomas Grey, Patricia Williams, Terry Fisher, Armstead
Robinson, Gwendolyn Hall, Jon Goldman, Michelle Aronowitz, Wendy Lynch, Leslie Harris,
Alice Yang Murray, Karen Dunn-Haley, Wendy Wall, and the members of the U.S. History
Workshop at Stanford for invaluable comments on drafts of this Article. This Article was
prepared while I was a Fellow at the Stanford Humanities Center and is a selection from a
dissertation-in-progress by the same title. I am grateful for research funds provided by the
American Historical Association, the Stanford Humanities Center, and the Center for Research
on Legal Institutions.
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would over a defective horse or piece of machinery.2 Similarly, slave
owners sued hirers, overseers, and other white men who beat or
neglected their slaves for damage to their property.' Yet in these
mundane civil disputes, the parties in the courtroom brought into
question, and gave legal meaning to, the "character" as well as the
resistant behavior of enslaved people who persisted in acting as
people.
Of course, horses could run away or be recalcitrant without being
human, leading one historian to suggest that slaves influenced the law
merely in the way that horses influenced the law.4 Indeed, some
legal historians have denied the existence of any "person/property"
tension in the law of slavery at all, arguing that slaves were simply
property with human qualities.5  From this perspective, any
contradictions in slavery law can be explained by slaveholders' efforts
to shape the law instrumentally to serve their own economic interests.
Yet to argue that there were tensions in the law is not to suggest that
the law did not bolster the slave economy, nor is it to suggest that the
typical Southern slaveholder or jurist suffered great angst over
treating people as things. Rather, I will argue that slaves themselves
influenced the law far more than things or horses ever could. In civil
2. Most sales contracts for slaves included a declaration that the slave was "sound in body
and mind and a slave for life," so these suits were for breach of an express contract. When no
express contract existed, the states varied in their approaches. South Carolina followed the old
rule, "a sound price implies a sound article," while most other states moved toward a rule of
"caveat emptor" ("buyer beware"). Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 324 (1793).
Louisiana's Civil Code included strict consumer protections providing for rescission (or
"redhibition") of slave sales in the event of "redhibitory" defects such as illness, madness,
addiction to theft, or the habit of running away. LA. CiV. CODE, Bk. III, Tit. 7, Chap. 6, § 3,
"Of the Vices of Things Sold," arts. 2496-505 (1824) (codified as amended in LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. arts. 2520-527 (West 1992) (relating only to animals)). See also Andrew Fede, Legal
Protection for Slave Buyers in the U.S. South. A Caveat Concerning Caveat Emptor, 31 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 322 (1987); Judith K. Schafer, "Guaranteed Against the Vices and Maladies
Prescribed by Law": Consumer Protection, the Law of Slave Sales, and the Supreme Court in
Antebellum Louisiana, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 306 (1987).
3. See Judith K. Schafer, "Details Are of a Most Revolting Character" Cruelty to Slaves as
Seen in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 68 CmI.-KENT L. REv. 1283 (1993).
4. Fede, supra note 2, at 323.
5. See, e.g., ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WrrHOUT RlGrrs (1992); Leon Higginbotham &
Barbara Kopytoff, Property First Humanity Second: The Recognition of the Slave's Human
Nature in Virginia Civil Law, 50 Ouio ST. L.J. 511 (1989). As William W. Fisher III has noted,
many historians have wrestled with the doctrinal contradictions of treating the slave as person
and property. William W. Fisher III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 1051, 1056-57 (1993). Some historians argue that "the contradictions are only apparent;
careful analysis will show that all aspects of slave law were shrewdly designed to serve the
interests of slave owners," and that the slave was always and only property; others "acknowledge
that the law of slavery was riddled with genuine inconsistencies but contend that they were all
the fruits of a single, fundamental contradiction-the incompatibility of slave socioeconomic
relations ... and bourgeois socioeconomic relations"; finally, still others explain the
inconsistencies as a relic of the genealogical origins of slavery law in Roman law, English
common law, villenage, and the slave code of Barbados. Id. As Fisher contends, "[w]e can
understand better the law of slavery by examining its relationships to Southern ideology." Id.
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disputes such as warranty suits, slaves forced the law to consider their
character, challenging slaveholders' self-conception as masters and
6statesmen. In other words, these cases mattered to white
Southerners because their self-understandings as white masters
depended on their relationships to black slaves; putting black
character on trial called white character into question as well.7
The issue of slave character arose most directly in suits for breach
of warranty of "moral qualities." While sellers rarely warranted a
slave's good character in writing, and courts were reluctant to imply
such a warranty in the purchase contract, these cases often reached
court in actions for fraud or deceit, when buyers charged that sellers
had orally vouched for the slave's good character. Moral qualities
included not only the general character of the slave, but also his or
her "habits" of drinking, stealing, and running away.' Slave character
also went on trial whenever a slave's runaway habit or other "vice"
became an excuse for a white person to take some action against a
slave, such as shooting the slave; an owner or hirer sometimes also
gave a slave's character as an excuse for why the slave died or got
sick.
Disputes over the sales and hire of slaves have received little
scholarly attention until the last decade, when legal historians began
examining the "private" law of slavery. Their studies have il-
luminated the effects of regionalism in American law, and the
relationship between legal developments and economic development
in the nineteenth-century South.' In particular, historians have called
attention to the dilemmas antebellum Southern judges faced in
applying legal rules first developed by Northern and English courts to
cases involving slaves. In the most cited example, the majority of
Southern courts refused to apply the fellow-servant rule, crucial to in-
6. Kenneth Greenberg has shown the symbiosis of ideals of mastery and statesmanship in
antebellum Southern culture. KENNETH S. GREENBERG, MASTERS AND STATESMEN (1985).
7. See Walter Johnson, Masters and Slaves in the Market: Slavery and the New Orleans
Trade, 1804-1864 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) for a discussion
of masters' dependence on slaves for their self-conceptions, in the marketplace as well as the
courtroom.
8. The term "character" was sometimes used in the antebellum period to mean "reputation,"
as in, "he gave his good character," or "he had the character in the neighborhood as a .... "
This usage does not necessarily mean, however, that "character" referred to something less
important because it was exterior. While New Englanders recognized a strong division between
external appearances and one's inner, "true" self, so that reputation could serve only as evidence
of character, Kenneth Greenberg has recently shown the extent to which, for nineteenth-century
Southerners, appearances were what mattered. Kenneth S. Greenberg, The Nose, the Lie, and
the Duel in the Antebellum South, 97 AM. HisT. REv. 57, 63 (1992).
9. See, e.g., AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (David S.
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dustrialization in the North, to slaves.' ° The only study of breach of
warranty suits took this approach as well, pointing out that while
South Carolina allowed implied warranties for slaves ("a sound price
implies a sound commodity"), other states followed the newer rule of
"caveat emptor," which is seen by some historians as a hallmark of
capitalist development."
Yet looking beyond appellate opinions to trial records suggests that
these cases can tell us about more than just the economics of slave
law; they can bring the courtroom to life as a cultural arena as well.
Viewing law from an anthropological perspective as "one of the great
cultural formations of human life," we can see the courtroom as an
arena in which people created meaning. 2 Disputes over the nature
of an individual slave's character brought forth many of the racial
theories that characterized Southern culture, and helped to define
which images of black men and women would prevail in the legal
arena. Parties came into the courtroom telling various stories about
slaves' character, but the courtroom process favored certain stories
over others. When the slave at issue was a woman, the range of
acceptable stories narrowed dramatically. By privileging particular
slave personae, the law established racial meanings, not only through
specific stereotypes of black people, but by painting a picture of black
moral character development that differed from Southern white
accounts of white moral character development. Thus, even the
"private law" of slaves as property contributed to the construction of
race and gender in Southern culture. 3 As William W. Fisher III has
10. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CON-
SIDERATIONS OF HUMANFrY AND INTEREST 45-49 (1981); Paul Finkelman, Slaves as Fellow
Servants: Ideology, Law and Industrialization, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 269 (1987); Frederick
Wertheim, Note, Slavery and The Fellow-Servant Rule: An Antebellum Dilemma, 61 N.Y.U. L
REV. 1112 (1986).
11. Fede, supra note 2, at 329-50; for a discussion of caveat emptor, see MORTON HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 180 (1977).
12. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 219 (1983).
13. Critical race and gender theorists have explored some of the ways in which American
legal structures and vocabulary shape the meaning of race and gender. For discussions by
historians of the historical "construction" of race and gender, see generally MELTON MCLAuRIN,
CELIA: A SLAVE (1992); Barbara Jeanne Fields, Race and Ideology in American History, in
REGION, RACE AND RECONSTRUCTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C. VANN WOODWARD 143-77
(J. Morgan Kousser & James M. McPherson eds., 1982); Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-
American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race, 17 SIGNS 251 (Winter 1992). For
discussions of the role of law in that process, see, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demar-
ginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CH. LEGAL F. 139; Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991); Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made
Visible: Law, Metaphor and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L. 437 (1993); see also BELL HOOKS,
BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION (1992); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1980s, at 57-135 (1986).
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argued, noting the links between Southern law and Southern ideology
may explain doctrinal inconsistencies in slavery law far better than
simply equating legal rules with parties' interests.14
This Article will examine the legal constructions of black character
at precisely the moment when slaves were most "property"-like-as
the objects of sale and rental. Andrew Fede, who has done the only
published study of slave warranty cases outside of Louisiana, dismisses
cases directly involving slave character as doctrinally unimportant,
because appellate courts limited buyers' recourse to implied warran-
ties when "moral qualities" of a slave were at issue.15 Certainly,
appellate judges strove to keep these cases out of the courtroom.
Yet, not only did this effort fail, but in making it, judges revealed the
importance of these cases in Southern culture. In 1821, South
Carolina Judge Abraham Nott warned that extending an implied
warranty of soundness to a slave's moral qualities would be "worse
than opening Pandora's box upon the community."16 By this, he
acknowledged the dangers that litigating slave character posed for a
system based on denying the personhood of human property.
Mark Tushnet, in his comprehensive study of the appellate law of
slavery, suggests that the logic of the slave system demanded such a
separation between contract law and slavery law, with the law of
commerce being in the world of "interest" and the law of slavery
being in the realm of "humanity."' 7 Yet, the interwoven nature of
"humanity" and "interest," both at the level of individual master-slave
relationships and at the level of complex market transactions, under-
mines any such separation.
In commercial trials, slaves were viewed simultaneously as capital,
as labor, and as people. Although most white Southerners perceived
no contradiction in commodifying slaves, their moral systems suffered
some strain in the effort. Christian apologists for slavery went to
great lengths to justify slavery as a moral institution. But the
difficulty of reconciling slave identities in the courtroom arose not
from the planter's moral dilemma, but from the inherent relationship
of slavery to liberal legal institutions. As James Oakes argues, there
was an "intrinsically ambiguous relationship between slavery and the
polity [in the South] .... The slaveholders had helped create the
liberal institutions within which they exercised their power.... And
yet liberalism, in the end, provided the slaves with the crack into
14. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1057.
15. Fede, supra note 2, at 333-34. For Louisiana, see JUDrriH KELLEHER SCHAFER,
SLAVERY, CIVIL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 127-48 (1994); Johnson, supra
note 7.
16. Smith v. McCall, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 220, 224 (1821).
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which their acts of resistance drove the decisive wedge.""8 Runaway
and disobedient slaves forced their relationships with their masters
into the courts, an arena in which liberal legal institutions formed a
buffer against the masters' absolute power. Oakes concludes that,
because "the laws and decisions regulating slavery were formulated
within a liberal state that was not the historical creature of the
slaveholding class," a "tone of desperation hovered.., over the case
law of slavery in the Old South."19  Judge Nott's warning about
Pandora's box, echoes this "tone of desperation."
This Article is based on a review of published state supreme court
reports of civil disputes involving slaves in South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana from 1800 to 1870 (about 600
cases); all of the available trial records of those cases in South
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi (about 200 cases); all the
available trial records for those cases directly involving slave character
in Louisiana (about 70 cases); as well as a survey of the unappealed
cases in Adams County, Mississippi (roughly 8,000 of 30,000 cases
from 1798 to 1861 were surveyed; 300 cases involved slaves).'
The five states surveyed comprise the region known today as the
"Deep South," or the "Black Belt" in the antebellum era. These
states were united by the culture and the economy of the cotton
plantation. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, they
encompassed the largest slave populations in the United States
because the Deep Southern states were the greatest slave importers
in the domestic trade. These states, with large numbers of slaves and
slave buyers, as well as large plantations, generated vigorous litigation
over slave sales and fostered a relatively coherent planter culture and
ideology. At the same time, the states are geographically distinct
enough to illustrate the contrast between the "Old South" of South
Carolina and the newer areas of the Southwest, such as Mississippi,
and between the common law regimes and the civil law system of
Louisiana.
18. JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH 139
(1990).
19. Id. at 159-60.
20. For the 1850s, I looked at each case before the circuit court. For the earlier years, I
sampled one drawer out of every three; the records are handwritten, rolled, tied with a ribbon,
and housed in metal drawers, of which there are 300 in all. Due to the unique and handwritten
nature of most of these records, and the vagaries of their storage, certain citation information
is not consistently available. Pinpoint cites to these sources would be unhelpful, as there are
generally no page numbers. Additionally, other information such as the month of decision is
occasionally missing from the opinion itself.
272
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Of the five states, Louisiana had by far the most state supreme
court litigation on these subjects. Because of Louisiana's codified
consumer protections for slave buyers, warranty litigation was
extremely common. Thus, my examples are often drawn from
Louisiana court records. Despite an unusual Roman law heritage,
there is no indication that Louisiana courts addressed the issue of
slave character differently than did the courts of other Deep Southern
states. The conflicting strands of racial ideology of antebellum
Southern planters were far more important to legal developments
than the genealogical origins of a state's laws. Furthermore, the
presence and status of free people of color in New Orleans does not
seem to have altered white attitudes toward black slaves.
Nor did I find a significant difference between the appealed cases
and those that ended in a county court. To test whether or not
appealed cases provide a representative sampling, I reviewed more
than one third of all cases argued at the trial level in Adams County,
Mississippi, which included the slave market at Natchez. I focused on
this area for several reasons. First, the Adams County court records
are complete, at least for the years 1817 to 1861, with some records
remaining from 1798 to 1817. This is quite rare among Deep
Southern counties, where many of the courthouses that survived the
Civil War burned down in the following century, and many court
officials simply lost or threw away their old records. Natchez is also
a worthwhile subject for in-depth study because it was the home of
the "nabobs," a center of wealth and large slaveholding in the cotton
South. In the Southwest, Natchez's active slave market was second
only to that of New Orleans. Lastly, this local study also allowed me
to examine more closely the question of change over time. While I
found that litigation increased over the antebellum period, particularly
after the economic ups and downs of the 1830s, and there was a slight
trend towards more favorable outcomes for slave buyers, I did not
find noticeable changes in the imagery and ideology of black
character. Although I hesitate to present a static picture of antebel-
lum legal culture, I was impressed more by the consistencies among
cases over time than by the contrasts among them.
Part I of this Article examines images of the "good" slave and the
"bad" slave which emerged from civil trials. It considers how com-
modification of slaves' character and labor shaped the way witnesses
spoke about slaves, and the profound impact gender narratives had on
racial imagery, not only because white Southern stereotypes of black
women and men were evident in the courtroom, but also because
those stereotypes shaped the interpretation of slaves' perceived
shortcomings as laborers. Part II explores the stories that witnesses,
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and behaved the way they did. In particular, stories about why slaves
ran away, or had the character of runaways, determined the outcome
of many warranty and hire cases. The answers that courtroom
participants gave to these questions depended in part on whether the
slave at issue was a woman or a man. This Part examines the
"medicalization" of slave "vice" that colored accounts of slave
character in many cases, but especially those involving women.
Finally, Part III of the Article discusses the ways in which these cases
challenged the Southern legal and cultural order. These cases
frequently forced lawyers and judges to acknowledge slave agency,
such as when witnesses noted a slave's own reasons for behaving in
a certain way, when a slave's action resulted in a tort, or when a slave
deceived a white man. This Part will also analyze how courts dealt
with the impossibility of excluding slaves' own words from testimony
in these cases.
I. WHAT IS A GOOD SLAVE?
Parties in the antebellum courtroom painted a picture of good and
bad slaves which sometimes contradicted the stereotypes popularized
by polemicists on both sides of the slavery debate. The stereotypes
noted by historians John Blassingame and Deborah Gray White-the
childlike "Sambo," the rebellious "Nat," the average "Jack," the
sexual "Jezebel," and the motherly "Mammy"-may have shaped
white Southerners' understanding of their relationships with enslaved
African-Americans, but not all of these stereotypes emerged in the
courtroom.2' For example, while black women were rarely vilified
as harshly as black men who were identified as "Nats," nor were they
portrayed in sexual terms as "Jezebels." Furthermore, witnesses'
characterizations of good slaves as honest, intelligent, and industrious
call into question the sincerity of their belief in "Sambo" and highlight
the fact that the qualities slaveholders prized in slaves were those
useful in a market economy. Most descriptions of slaves included an
estimate of dollar value, and most disputes hinged in one way or
another on slaves' skills as workers. Suits involving the skills of a
slave, in particular, brought the intersection of black status as capital
and as labor into relief.
21. See JOHN BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE OLD
SouTm 133-34 (1972); DEBORAH GRAY WHIrrE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE
PLANTATION SouTH 27-61 (1985). The actual existence of "Sambo" as a personality type in the




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol7/iss2/2
Gross
As George Fredrickson has pointed out, Southerners needed a
spectrum of images to deal with individual slaves in their daily
lives.22 Witnesses at trial testified about slaves in ways that did not
fit into the simple stereotypes propagated by appellate judges and
legal treatise writers, particularly in recognizing the personalities,
human motivations, and skills of individual slaves. 3 For example,
the good slave, at the trial level, often had qualities "Sambo" did not
have, such as honesty and industry, and attributes beyond those of
which "Sambo" was capable. Slave sellers generally advertised their
slaves to be "a No. 1 boy," "honest, industrious and free from vice,"
or "honest, sober, humble and not given to be a runaway." 24 In one
Louisiana case, the seller's witnesses proved William's honesty by
testifying that he, "a boy of good character perfectly honest and sober
... used to be sent to the house of the most respectable men in
[town] to shave them when they did not like to come to the shop."
William "was well informed and well acquainted with amounts and
generally managed [his owner's] affairs."'  Likewise, an overseer
testified that Aglae was "very industrious very clean,, 26 and Lucin-
da's owner advertised her as "an honest trusty servant" who "always
brought her wages in."27 Honesty and industry were qualities that
both male and female slaves might exhibit.
Occasionally, witnesses referred to slaves' intelligence or morality,
implicitly or explicitly raising them to the level of whites.' At times,
parties spoke of slaves as "men" and "women" or "persons" rather
than "boys," "girls," or "wenches." For example, in one slave
inventory, all adult slaves (over the age of eighteen) were designated
"men" or "women," while all children were designated "boys" or
"girls., 29  In Pilie v. Lalande, one witness reported that a female
slave was "quick and intelligent," another that she was "of good
22. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, TIE ARROGANCE OF RACE 211 (1988) [hereinafter
FREDRICKSON, ARROGANCE].
23. Self-conscious legal writers of treatises, as well as appellate judges, drew heavily on such
stereotypes of the black slave as a happy, docile "Sambo;" a rebellious "Nat;" or a sensuous
"Jezebel." See Fisher, supra note 5.
24. White v. Cumming, Docket #357 (Alexandria ser., 1826) (available in Supreme Court
Archives, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans [hereinafter SCA-UNO]). Appeal
reported in 5 Mart. (n.s.) 199 (La. 1826).
25. Testimony of William Rudder, Castellano v. Peillon, Docket #944 (New Orleans ser.,
May 1824) (available in SCA-UNO). Appeal reported in 2 Mart. (n.s.) 466 (La. 1824).
26. Testimony of Etienne Girard, Petit v. Laville, Docket #4660 (New Orleans ser., June
1843) (available in SCA-UNO). Appeal reported in 5 Rob. 117 (La. 1843).
27. Palmvitz v. Fassman, Docket #512 (New Orleans ser., June 1847) (available in SCA-
UNO). Appeal reported in 2 La. Ann. 625 (1847).
28. See, e.g., Chretien v. Theard, Docket #612 (New Orleans ser., Feb. 1822) (available in
SCA-UNO). Appeal reported in 11 Mart. (n.s.) 11 (La. 1822).
29. Lewis v. Casenave, Docket #2559 (New Orleans ser., Dec. 1833) (available in SCA-
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disposition intelligent and a good servant."'  In tort cases in which
the court had to decide whether or not to hold a white person
responsible for injury to a black slave, judicial comments about the
volition of the slave were sometimes accompanied by the recognition
that the slave was "a moral agent."'" On the other hand, black intel-
ligence, particularly in a woman, could be a negative attribute from
a white point of view. In one case, Farmer tried to return Kitty
because "she knew too much ... the essence of Farmer's objection
was that the slave was too smart."32
A bad slave had the opposite characteristics: faithlessness, dishones-
ty, indolence, and insubordination. The same slaves whom sellers
portrayed as honest and trustworthy were accused, by slave buyers
suing for character defects, of being "vicious and worthless, habitual
and dangerous runaway," "ill disposed, faithless, inconstant, unsteady,
disobedient, and bad in all respects," or "dishonest, lazy and
vicious."33  An especially bad slave, Lawson, "was violent and
headstrong and abused the smaller negroes."' Another witness in
Adams County Court described his former slave Jesse as one whom
he had "bought ... in chains ... and sold ... in the stock, as a
notorious scoundrel."35  Such vehement denunciations of slaves'
whole character as degraded and vicious almost always referred to
male slaves. Witnesses might characterize enslaved women as lazy,
but the same stereotype of savagery did not apply to rebellious
women.36 For example, in one case about a runaway female slave, the
buyer's most detailed complaint about her character was that she was
"as smart a negro as any, if she would stay."37 In other cases, the
buyer merely argued that the female runaway was crazy or idiotic.38
30. Docket #1724 (New Orleans ser., Mar. 1829) (available in SCA-UNO). Appeal reported
in 7 Mart. (n.s.) 558 (1829). See also Plaintiff's Brief, Walker v. Hays, Docket #6606 (New
Orleans ser., Feb. 1860) (available in SCA-UNO). Appeal reported in 15 La. Ann. 640 (1860)
("The plaintiff ... established by Mr. Hair that [Agnes] was a very intelligent servant.").
31. See, e.g., Horlbeck v. Erickson, 39 S.C.L. (6 Rich.) 154 (1852).
32. Farmer v. Fiske, Docket #5248 (New Orleans ser., Dec. 1844) (available in SCA-UNO).
Appeal reported in 9 Rob. 351 (La. 1844).
33. Complaint, Taylor v. Cochran, Drawer 7, #1441 (Adams County Ct. [Miss. Terr.], June
Term 1802) (available in Historic Natchez Foundation records [hereinafter HNF]).
34. Penciled memo [probably by judge], Perkins v. Hundley, Drawer 91, #25 (Adams County
Cir. Ct., May Term 1819) (available in HNF).
35. Deposition of William Shaffer, Tull v. Walker, Drawer 70, (n. no.) (Adams County Cir.
Ct., May Term 1830) (available in HNF).
36. See, e.g., Laurence v. McFarlane, Docket #1722 (New Orleans ser., Mar. 1829) (available
in SCA-UNO). Appeal reported in 7 Mart. (n.s.) 558 (La. 1829) ("sold [Fanny] because she was
lazy").
37. Romer v. Woods, f.w.c. [free woman of color], Docket #1911 (New Orleans ser., Jan.
1851) (available in SCA-UNO). Appeal reported in 6 La. Ann. 29 (1851).
38. See, eg., lear v. Suares, Docket #2649 (New Orleans ser., Jan. 1835) (available in SCA-
UNO). Appeal reported in 7 La. 517 (1835); Briant v. Marsh, 19 La. 391 (1841).
276
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It is striking how frequently vice in enslaved men was connected
with dishonesty and faithlessness, suggesting that masters normally
could have expected honesty and loyalty from slaves. If all slaves
were mendacious "Sambos," this expectation would have made no
sense. Sometimes one party, usually the seller, invoked the "Sambo"
stereotype, arguing that one could not expect too much even from
good slaves; "it [is] very common amongst Negroes to steal a little
and run away."39 This bore out the stereotype of slaves as men-
dacious and mischievous, though generally harmless. Yet a strong
counterstory insisted that, in fact, well-treated, good slaves were both
honest and trustworthy. Indeed, in the same case, the witness being
deposed made plain that he "don't believed most negroes would steal
and run away."'  Thus, while Southerners in court spoke of bad
slaves as dishonest and vicious, they usually meant to distinguish the
character of these individuals from the general character of all black
slaves.
The emphasis in trials on honesty and industry also suggests that
whites highly prized these characteristics in slaves. As we saw in the
earlier example of William, an honest, industrious slave was one who
could be trusted to go out, do a job, and come home again. In a
market economy, these were particularly important attributes. Legal
disputes over slave character took place in a market context in which
the slave's value as a worker was foremost in the parties' minds.
Because slaves were, along with land, the most important form of
capital in the antebellum South, positive descriptions of a slave's
character often were accompanied by an estimate of value, such as
"being a fine fellow honest industrious free from vice and such an one
as would command a good price" or "a Negro woman slave whose
character was exceptionable and was considered not so valuable on
account of her bad qualities but was worth as he considered $400."41
The constant numerical valuation of slaves' characters meant that
whenever slaves were viewed as people, their property aspect also
intruded. Commodification meant always thinking about slave
character in dollar terms.
Witnesses and sellers also described good or bad slaves in terms of
their work skills or the jobs they performed. Women were dispropor-
tionately represented in both warranty and hire disputes over skilled
slaves. Indeed, if a buyer sued a seller for a breach of warranty in the
39. Cozzins v. Whitacker, Bk. 34, Docket #1261 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, Jan. 1833) (available
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sale of a female slave, and the case did not involve physical illness or
death, the complaint most likely claimed that she did not perform
sufficiently as a house servant. Thus, it appears that behavior that
might have been interpreted as a deficiency in the "character" of a
man was more often portrayed as deficiency in the "skill" of a
woman.
In valuing slaves, skills could balance qualities considered to be
defects, such as old age or high temper. Philander, for example, "was
an old man about 50 years old; he was represented as a very good
carpenter; though he was old, yet he might be more valuable on
account of being a mechanic."42  In another warranty case, Sally
"was a pretty good looking old woman-was a House servant, and
capable, but very high-tempered-she was an excellent Cook-she was
put into the work house for her impudence."'43 The defendant told
one witness that he could not manage her, and a former owner
testified "that Sally was a very capable servant and objectionable only
as respected her temper-which was intolerable.""
In order to recover the price of a slave, it was usually legally
insufficient to prove that a slave did not have the skills the seller
represented her to have. However, a skills claim could supplement
another claim of unsoundness to the benefit of the buyer. Evidence
that a seller had lied about a slave's skills tended to prove to the trier
of fact that the seller had also lied about other things. For example,
in Brocklebank v. Johnson,' the buyer's primary claim was that
Romeo was a drunkard and suffered illness from his drinking. In
addition, though, he wanted to prove that Johnson had mis-
represented Romeo to be a good bricklayer. The trial judge
instructed the jury to consider both claims-but for the skills claim,
"the Plaintiff could only recover the difference in value between a
Bricklayer and a common negro. ' Brocklebank won both a jury
verdict and an appellate judgment that he could recover for deceit
even if Johnson had given no written warranty of Romeo's character
or his skills as a bricklayer.47
42. Testimony of Thomas N. Gadsden, Gantt v. Venning, Box 34 (City Ct. of Charleston,
Jan. 1840) (available in South Carolina Supreme Court Records, South Carolina Department
of Archives & History) [hereinafter SCDAH]. Appeal reported in Cheves 87 (S.C. 1840) [no
S.C.L. volume available].
43. Campbell v. Atchison, Box 21 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Records, Mar. 1827) (available in SCDAH).
The word "old" in the quotation was added to the transcript in a different ink.
44. Id.
45. Box 28 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Records, Apr. 1834) (available in SCDAH). Appeal reported in
Johnson v. Brockelbank, 2 Hill 353 (S.C. 1834) [no S.C.L. volume available].
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also Athey v. Olive, 34 Ala. 711, 712-13 (1859) (stating that defendant refused
to pay note because Matilda was crazy and because "Matilda ... was represented by the plaintiff
to be a good cook, washer and ironer, and seamstress, that she came up to neither of these
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The Louisiana Supreme Court heard several of these mixed-claim
cases involving women sold to do housework. The facts of these
cases, as described in the trial testimony, highlight the different
characterizations of women and men who refused to work. For
example, Grenier Petit sued Jean Laville because Aglae "was neither
a washer nor a good subject."'  The plaintiff brought forth witnesses
who testified that they had tried the slave Aglae as a washer and that
"she did not appear to understand any thing about washing., 49 One
witness, Mine. Felix, "gave her two shirts to wash and after keeping
them during four hours she returned them without having finished
them." She testified on cross-examination that "she can say in an
hour if a person is a washer or not."'  A woman who worked for
Mine. Felix testified that she had been obliged to rewash the two
shirts Aglae washed, and that although she "is not a washer by trade,"
she "is a good judge of washing."51
It is impossible to determine whether Aglae did not know how to
wash shirts, or if she simply decided not to wash them as a form of
resistance, but it is significant that all the witnesses labelled Aglae's
defect as a lack of washing skills rather than rebelliousness or even
laziness-in stark contrast to cases in which male slaves who failed to
complete work were branded rebels with bad characteT and habits.
Why white Southerners found it easier to imagine black women as
incompetent rather than vicious is open to conjecture. Perhaps it was
too far a stretch to conceive of a female house slave, a "Mammy," as
a rebel; perhaps gendered notions of competency made it easier to
attribute incompetence to black women. Certainly, the absence of
whites' fear of "Nat" when the slave at issue was a woman made
masters less likely to conjure up a vicious rebel at the first failure to
obey orders.
The debates over slaves' skills often revealed how low judicial
standards were for the level of skill, or for the amount of work,
representations"); Nowell v. Gadsden, Box 42 (City Ct. of Charleston, May 1848) (available in
SCDAH) (describing breach of warranty for Lander because of illness and lack of skill as
blacksmith); Chretien v. Theard, Docket #612 (New Orleans ser., Feb. 1822) (available in SCA-
UNO), appeal reported in 11 Mart. 11 (La. 1822) (reporting that buyer instantly discovered that
[Lafortune] was neither a carpenter nor joiner ... a drunkard and a thief and also an
insubordinate slave").
48. Petit v. Laville, Docket #4660 (New Orleans ser., June 1841) (available in SCA-UNO).
Appeal reported in 5 Rob. 117 (La. 1841). See also Buhler v. McHatton, Docket #3448 (New
Orleans ser., Feb. 1854) (available in SCA-UNO). Appeal reported in 9 La. Ann. 192 (1854)
("Jane has proved entirely useless as a cook, and 2d, because she is addicted to madness,
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reasonably expected of slaves. In Chretien v. Theard,"2 William
Rogers, a carpenter, testified that the slave Lafortune was "expert in
neither trade of Carpenter or Joiner, that he said Lafortune is not
more expert in them than an intelligent man who has never learnt
said trade."' 3  Despite the fact that several other witnesses cor-
roborated this testimony, the judge gave great weight to the testimony
of two witnesses who had known Lafortune many years earlier, and
who said "that he was capable of executing work when market [sic]
out to him.'" The judge wrote that "[tihis I think is as much as
could be expected of an unlettered slave. It could not be supposed
that he could calculate the dimensions and proportions of a building.
It was not to be expected that a slave should be a master
workman."55
Clearly, William Rogers believed that Lafortune, sold as a
"carpenter and joiner," should have the skills of a carpenter and a
joiner, able to perform his work better than even an "intelligent man"
without training. In contrast, the judge implied that a slave carpenter
could meet a lower standard than a "carpenter" or a "joiner"; the
judge did not consider an "intelligent man" to be the appropriate
reference point for "an unlettered slave." While ordinary Southern
whites expected slaves to meet the industry's level of skill, judges in
these cases avoided inscribing in the law too high a standard for
slaves, one that might undermine the "Sambo" stereotype.
Finally, slaves' status as capital and as labor intersected. Litigants
argued vehemently over a slave's skills in determining the slave's
dollar value. For example, in Stone & Best v. Watson, 6 the buyer
succeeded in proving a slave unsound because of illness. He also
contended that if she was sound, her false reputation as "a No. 1
seamstress" ought to be taken into acount in the determination of her
value.57 In Campbell ads. Atchison,58 one witness testified that "he
would not have given a Dollar for" Salley, for whom the buyer had
paid $350, "but that she ought to have brought $250.""9 His reason
for considering her worthless was her temper, but he recognized that
her skills would bring money on the market. Another witness
testified that Salley "would at the present time be worth $350, but for
her temper."'  In Porcher ads. Caldwell,61 a witness testified "that




56. 37 Ala. 279 (1861).
57. Id.
58. Box 21 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Records, Mar. 1827) (available in SCDAH).
59. Id.
60. Id. (emphasis in original).
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a first rate cook would be worth $500," but that because the slave had
poor cooking skills, he "dont think the negro worth $350 if she had
been sound."62
The cases involving slaves' skills show several sometimes contradic-
tory impulses by all parties involved: witnesses' attribution of intel-
ligence, ability, and efficiency to enslaved people; judges' unwil-
lingness to set high standards for slaves' labor; the constant jux-
taposition of paternalist rhetoric with discussions of slaves in terms of
dollar value; and a focus on women's inability as opposed to insubor-
dination. Yet, for the most part, disputes over skilled slaves avoided
the starkest contrasts between the good slave and the bad slave for
the very reason that they presupposed a competency on the slaves'
part that defied the stereotype.
II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SLAVE CHARACTER
Disputes involving runaway slaves, unlike those regarding slaves'
skills, highlight the schizophrenic racial iconography of white
Southerners: the hope that slaves were happy "Sambos" and "Ma-
mmys" was always balanced by the fear that if the bonds of slavery
were loosened, the childlike slaves would revert to savage beasts.
What the trials help to illuminate in this child-savage duality is the
multiplicity of stories about what made a slave into a child or a
savage. Slave buyers and sellers, hirers and owners, told different
stories about the dependence of slaves' characters on their masters'
influence, and the immutability of slave "vice."
As George Fredrickson has argued, "Sambo" and "Nat" were two
sides of the same coin: according to Southern white racial theory, "the
Negro was by nature a savage brute. Under slavery, however, he was
'domesticated' or, to a limited degree, 'civilized.' Hence docility was
not so much his natural character as an artificial creation of
slavery."'  As Dr. Samuel Cartwright put it, "the negro must, from
necessity, be the slave of man or the slave of Satan. '  White
Southerners believed that black character was plastic; one Virginia
planter wrote that "[t]he character of the negro... is like the plastic
clay, which may be moulded into agreeable or disagreeable figures
61. Box 37 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Records, Mar. 1842) (available in SCDAH). Appeal reported in
2 McMullan 329 (S.C. 1842) [no S.C.L. volume available].
62. Id.
63. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON
AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 53-54 (1917) [hereinafter
FREDRICKSON, IMAGE].
64. Samuel Cartwright, Negro Freedom an Imposssibility Under Nature's Laws, 30 DEBOw'S
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according to the skill of the moulder."'  But they did not think it
was "infinitely plastic": "innate racial traits limited his potential
development to a more or less tenuous state of 'semi-civilization. ' ''i s
This picture of black character as malleable to a certain point
should be contrasted with Southern whites' conceptions of their own
character development. Southern ideals of white character largely
depended on slavery and a contrast between black and white. As
James Oakes and other historians of Southern culture have explained,
Southern society was based on both honor and slavery; slaves were
those who could have no honor, whereas all white men could
potentially take part in the code of honor.67  From Scottish moral
philosophy, white Southerners inherited the view that the "moral
sense" was an innate faculty of all white men.' This moral sense
could be developed through education, or it could be left in the
rough, but all white men possessed it.
By the early nineteenth century, most white Southerners believed
that blacks were bereft of the moral capacity to be educated. While
proslavery writers did not put their conviction of black moral
inferiority in terms of "the moral sense," they asserted frequently
enough that blacks could not benefit from moral education because
they lacked the necessary prerequisites. 69  Therefore, the plasticity
of slaves' "character" did not necessarily equate with moral develop-
ment as understood by educated whites. Rather, Southern ideologues
emphasized the imitative abilities of the black slave. As Cartwright
65. H. [only authorial information given in source], Remarks on Overseers, and the Proper
Treatment of Slaves, 5 FARMERS' REG. 302 (1837).
66. See FREDRICKSON, IMAGE, supra note 63, at 52.
67. See James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom, in SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 3-39 (Orlando
Patterson ed., 1982); see also FREDRICKSON, IMAGE, supra note 63, at 159; GREENBERG, supra
note 6, at 65. The dishonor of slaves played itself out in the law. For example, slave testimony
was barred because slaves could not be trusted to tell the truth like honorable men. Fisher,
supra note 5, at 1077.
68. See E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD, THE GENTLEMAN THEOLOGIANS: AMERICAN THEOLOGY
IN SOUTHERN CULTURE, 1795-1860, at 110-26 (1978). Many Southern theologians adopted the
"faculty psychology" of the Scottish philosophers, which posited an innate "'moral sense'
antecedent to self-regarding motives and independent of revelation." Id. at 130, 138.
69. See, eg., 2 THE INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES, STATISTICS, ETC., OF THE UNITED STATES,
AND MORE PARTICULARLY OF THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN STATES (J.D.B. DeBow ed.,
1854) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES]. More specifically, see John Campbell, Negro-
Mania" being an examination of the falsely-assumed equality of the various races of men, in 2
INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES, supra, at 196 ("Lawrence remarks, that the difference of color
'between the white and the black races is not more striking than the preeminence of the former
in moral feelings and in mental endowments."'); Chancellor Harper, Negro Slavery, Address at
the Society for the Advancement of Learning, of South Carolina 205 ("Objection answered-
'The slave is cut off from the means of intellectual, moral, and religious improvement, and in
consequence his moral character becomes depraved, and he addicted to degrading vices"';
arguing that slave cannot improve himself because he has no capacity for moral character
development). See also COBB, supra note 1, at 37-38 (considering "[tihe development of his
moral character, when in contact with civilization," and finding that blacks "exhibit the same
characteristics" of moral degradation, whatever the circumstances).
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wrote, "When made contented and happy, as [slaves] always should
be, they reflect their master in their thoughts, morals, and religion, or
at least they are desirous of being like him. They imitate him in
everything, as far as their imitative faculties, which are very strong,
will carry them., 70 Thus, a well-governed slave might mimic moral
development without actually having her own moral faculty to
develop.
A. "Like master, like man"
In warranty cases, the malleability of slave character was essentially
a seller's story. Only a seller would suggest that a slave's character
depended on good government by a master. In contrast, the buyer
unhappy with a runaway or "vicious" slave preferred to portray the
slave's character as immutable. This particular slave, according to the
typical buyer, was an incorrigible savage under any circumstances.
Buyers painted a world in which slaves were born with particular
characteristics, just as whites were. Alternatively, while malleable
character made slaves seem childlike but human, immutable vicious-
ness could render an enslaved person subhuman.
Buyers rejected any evidence of mutable character. Because a slave
could have no reason to want her freedom, she must simply have a
runaway vice or habit. As John Staples, a witness for the buyer in
Hagan v. Rist,71 explained, "I do not know why he runaway [sic] he
certainly had no reason I think it is a natural vice with him."'72 John
Staples believed John (the slave) to be immutably vicious. William
J. Ethridge, the overseer, corroborated this testimony by saying that
John "ranaway without any cause whatever,"73 in contrast to a slave
who was whipped or had other reasons. Therefore, John must be a
runaway. Likewise, Abram Taylor complained, Pompey was "ill
disposed, faithless, inconstant, unsteady, disobedient, and bad on all
respects," and "John Cochran and Peter Watts well knew him to
embrace the earliest opportunity to return to his old masters ....
Pompey never would remain or live with any other person or master
than [Cochran and Watts]."'74
70. Dr. Cartwright on the Caucasians and the Africans, 32 DEBOW's REv. 53, 53-54 (1861).
See also COBB, supra note 1, at 35 ("[T]he negro ... is imitative, sometimes eminently so, but
his mind is never inventive or suggestive. Improvement never enters into his imagination.").
71. Docket #4503 (New Orleans ser., June 1844) (available in SCA-UNO). Appeal reported
in 8 Rob. 106 (La. 1844).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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Slave buyers, hirers from whom slaves ran away, or persons accused
of shooting runaway slaves emphasized slaves' immutable viciousness,
and their proper exercise of control over the slaves. In Moran v.
Davis, 75 the slave Stephen ran away from Davis, who had hired him
from Moran. Moran then sued Davis for the price of Stephen; in
answer, Davis replied that Stephen "was of bad and insubordinate
character and difficult to manage and keep in proper subjec-
tion .... Defendant says he used only so much and such means as
were necessary to keep said negro under control ... . [He] was
unruly and insubordinate and would not submit to the control of the
defendant., 76  The jury agreed that Davis should not have to
reimburse Moran for the loss.7
The seller's story of malleability played into the paternalist defense
of slavery by shifting the focus from the slave's character to the
master's treatment of the slave. One case decided on appeal by Chief
Justice John Belton O'Neall of the South Carolina Supreme Court
illustrates this shift. In Johnson v. Wideman,78 the buyer (Wideman)
portrayed Charles as an insubordinate and vicious drunkard and
runaway, while the seller (Johnson) claimed that Charles behaved
badly only under bad government.79  Wideman's witnesses testified
that Johnson had represented Charles to be sober, honest, and
humble, that Johnson had said "he would trust him with money," and
that "a boy of ten years old could control him."'  Instead, according
to Alexander Cummins, "Charles would get drunk; he would not
work; he let his coal kiln burn up; was insolent; he was very often
drunk; he saw him once lying behind the shop, and at another time
in the woods. He (Charles) stayed with the defendant about two
months and then ran away."81
According to the buyer-defendant, not only was Charles lazy and
insolent, but he also cursed his overseer and attacked or threatened
other white men. One witness testified, "He was saucy: [one witness]
saw him shove a white man, named Cramer, down. He did not bring
75. Docket #1561 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, Apr. 1855) (available in Georgia Supreme Court
Records, Georgia Department of Archives & History [hereinafter GDAH]). Appeal reported
in 18 Ga. 722 (1855).
76. Id.
77.Id. In Thornton v. Towns, Jesse Thornton charged that Andrew Towns had violated a
hire contract by his cruel treatment of several slaves: Towns argued that Golding's bad
character fully justified his harsh treatment. Docket #3869 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, Jan. 1865)
(available in GDAH). Appeal reported in 34 Ga. 1225 (1865).
78. 1 Rice 325 (S.C. 1839) [no S.C.L. volume available].
79. In this case, the seller sued the buyer because he did not pay his note. Although the
trial records of this case are unavailable, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in an unusual
opinion, reprinted the report of the trial judge, including the testimony and briefs.
80. Id. at 328.
81. Id. at 327.
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much custom to the shop: he threatened to beat another white man
named Wells."'  The same witness revealed that Charles told Wells
that "no one man ever had or ever should master him."83 Another
witness reported that "Charles and Norris (a white man) were
gambling-he struck Norris. At a race, Berry [Charles's former
owner, before Johnson] and another white man were quarrelling.
Charles came up behind his master, shut up his fist and swore that he
wished he was a white man."'  Several witnesses testified to
Charles's drinking, swearing, laziness, and general insolence. One
witness even recounted a story of Charles pulling a knife to prevent
the witness from pulling Charles's two big dogs off his own little
dog.85
The defense maintained that Charles had been a runaway and a
drunk when Johnson, the seller, had owned him. John Wideman, a
relative of the defendant, testified that
[h]is brother (who as well as he, was a boy) was once about
whipping Charles's wife: she broke and run, crying and calling for
her husband. Charles came to her and asked what was the
matter: she said William, the witness' brother, was whipping her:
he swore he would mash him to the earth. At another time, he
and his brother chased Charles from the kitchen; he turned and
offered to fight them. 6
Other witnesses who lived near Johnson told stories of Charles
swearing that he would not live with Johnson, hiding in a willow
thicket when there was work to be done, and asking a storekeeper for
a ticket (a pass). Major William Eddings estimated Charles's value
over $1,000 when Johnson bought him from Berry, "taking him as he
was," because of his skill as a blacksmith.' On the day of the sale,
according to James Spikes, "Charles quarrelled with Berry: charged
him with keeping his wife, shut up his fist and was walking towards
Berry, when Johnson prevented him., 8  When the plaintiff-seller
tried to argue that a firmer master could have reined in Charles's mis-
behavior, defense witness Sherwood Corley testified that "he had
often helped to tie and whip [Charles]" when Berry owned him; "it
had no effect on him; he would curse his master as soon as taken
down. ,,89
82. Id. at 330.
83. Id. at 331.
84. Id. at 333.
85. Id. at 335.
86. Id. at 332-33.
87. Id. at 333.
88. Id. at 334.
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In short, according to the buyer-defendant in this case, Charles was
everything that struck terror into slaveholders' hearts about slaves:
he owned a dog (against the law); he was married (unrecognized by
law); worse, he tried to defend his wife's honor against white men; he
not only acted as though he were equal to a white man, he said he
wished he was a white man; he threatened white men with violence;
he refused to work unless he wished to; he did not respond to
whipping; and he ran away at will. He had two particularly dangerous
traits: first, insolence, which meant that he threatened white men;
second, the runaway habit, which meant that he threatened the
institution of slavery. In all of these offenses, according to the buyer-
defendant, Charles was impervious to varying treatment; he was
immutably vicious.
The plaintiff-seller's witnesses, however, told a different story.
According to them, Charles was a drunkard and an insolent negro
only when he lived with Wiley Berry, "himself a drinking, horse-
racing man"' (from whom Johnson bought Charles). As Lewis
Busby explained, "He had heard of [Charles's] drinking. He had
borne the character of an insolent negro: but not in the time he
belonged to the Johnsons."'91 Others testified that Charles was
humble and worked well; that when Johnson owned him, "he was not
so indolent as when he belonged to Berry."92 Berry had exposed
him frequently to spirits, and had whipped him frequently. Alexander
Presley testified that Wideman had known Charles's reputation and
had told Presley that Charles "was under a bad character ... as he
could out-general old Wiley Berry, he must be bad."93  Thus,
Johnson's case rested on the contentions that Charles was a good
slave when managed well and that the only evidence of his insolence
came from his behavior under Berry and under Wideman himself In
the alternative, Johnson argued that Wideman knew of Charles's bad
character before he bought him.'
The circuit judge, instructing the jury, asked, "[W]hat moral
qualities would be so material, as that a misrepresentation of them
would have the effect to rescind the contract?" He answered "that
any quality represented to exist, which, if it did not, would have the
effect of diminishing in a considerable degree, the usefulness and
90. Id. at 334.
91. Id. at 338.
92. Id. at 340.
93. Id. at 337.
94. Id. at 337-39.
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value of the slave, would have that effect." 95  He went on to
enumerate which of Charles's vices might qualify:
Habitual drunkenness was I told them, such a vicious habit as
would justify them in rescinding the contract, if they should
believe that it existed, that the plaintiff knew it, and so knowing,
deceived the defendant by informing him that the negro was
sober. I told them that occasional intoxication, not amounting to
a habit, would not justify them in rescinding a contract. An
habitual runaway was, I thought, a material defect, which might
justify them in finding, for the defendant, if there was on the part
of the plaintiff a wilful misrepresentation. Occasional flights of
a slave from his master's service for special causes would not
constitute any material moral defect.
Honesty, I said to them, was a material moral quality in a
slave: but nothing short of general dishonesty would show a
defect in this behalf. For occasional thefts among the tolerably
good slaves may be expected .... 96
The judge added a strong caveat, however. While all of these
qualities in a slave might justify nonpayment of a note, he stated that
the policy of allowing such a defense might be very well ques-
tioned. For, most commonly such habits were easy of correction
by prudent masters, and it was only with the imprudent that they
were allowed to injure the slave. Like master, like man was, I
told them, too often the case, in drunkenness, impudence, and
idleness.'
The stories of buyer and seller in Johnson v. Wideman highlight the
way that mutability of a slave's character could dominate litigation
over a slave's "vice." Charles, in the courtroom, appeared to be both
child and savage, but Wideman claimed that he was a savage no
matter what, whereas Johnson made the claim that Fredrickson
documents: Charles was "a child in his place, and a savage out ofit.'98
it.99
95. The judge began by instructing the jury that the defendant could not recover tort
damages for the plaintiff's deceit; the only question would be whether the defendant was
obligated to pay the $100 note. Id. at 342. This was a legal issue that cropped up frequently:
the distinction between breach of warranty-a contract action, which could only result in a
return of the slave and/or refund of the price--and deceit, a tort action, for which the injured
party could recover damages. Having settled the legal issue, the judge made it clear that the
moral issues would decide the case. Id. He also instructed the jury that they must find evidence
of fraud in order for the buyer-defendant to win. Id.
96. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 342-43. The jury found for the seller-plaintiff, Johnson; Wideman appealed on the
grounds that the judge's instructions had biased the jury for the plaintiff by ruling out damages
for the defendant. Though it was labeled "per curiam," Judge John B. O'Neall nevertheless
signed the opinion which affirmed the lower court judgment. Id. at 344-45.
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The judge's instructions contained, in microcosm, several of the
stories about slaves' character development. He drew a number of
dichotomies: "occasional intoxication" vs. "habitual drunkenness";
"occasional flights ... for special causes" vs. "habitual runaway";
"occasional thefts" vs. "general dishonesty." Like "Sambo," the
typical slave could be expected to drink, run away, and steal a
little-only when these acts came to define his character would he be
considered defective. On the other hand, black character, like white
character, was formed through habit, and masters were responsible for
slaves' habits.9 The trial judge, as well as Chief Justice O'Neall,
largely accepted Johnson's argument that Charles's misbehavior could
be attributed to the freedom Berry gave him and the bad example
Berry set. This theory of slave "vice"-"like master, like
man"-removed agency from the slave and portrayed the slave as an
extension of his master.
B. Run Away or Runaway?
"Some months after the said Negroe man had run away he learned
... that the same Negro was a runaway," explained one witness in a
Louisiana case.1"° The distinction between the act and the charac-
ter, drawn at length by the trial judge in Johnson v. Wideman, had
several implications. On the one hand, it was a simple recognition of
masters' lack of absolute control over their slaves; to define runaway
character or dishonesty by a single act would have opened the
floodgates, because acts of resistance simply happened too often. But
it was more than that: the exercise of proving a runaway character or
habit defined the slave by his vice and transformed the vice into an
immutable essence. An Alabama case may illustrate: In 1849,
Walker Reynolds sued William Ward for payment of an $800 note,
given for the purchase of a slave named Bill.1"' In defense, Ward
claimed that Bill was a runaway and that Reynolds had deceitfully
represented Bill as "a negro of excellent character and recommended
him in every particular extolling him both as to character and
99. See also Cozzins v. whitacker, Bk. 34, Docket #1261 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, Jan. 1833)
(available in ADAH) (stating that "[plaintiff's w]itness Mr. Henry Fort proved ... that he
Anthony would steal chickens &c and run away and that, that was his character" but defendant's
witness, Mr. Madden, testified "that it was very common amongst Negroes to steal a little and
run away, it was greatly owing to the kind of master or owner they had"); Perkins v. Hundley,
Drawer 91, #25 (Adams County Cir. Ct., May 1819) (available in HNF) (noting that Lawton was
good slave under his master, but "after his master died [Lawton] became a little unruly which
was the reason of his being sold").
100. Castellano v. Peillon, Docket #944 (New Orleans ser., May 1824) (available in SCA-
UNO). Appeal reported in 2 Mart. (n.s.) 466 (La. 1824).
101. Ward v. Reynolds, Bk. 221, Docket #4181 (Perry County Cir. Ct., Jan. 1858) (available
in ADAH). Appeal reported in 32 Ala. 384 (1858).
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value."'" Indeed, according to Ward, Reynolds had explained that
the only reason he was selling Bill was "that there had been a
disturbance between the negro and another about a negro woman the
wife of the other."'"
Reynolds, the seller, called witnesses to prove that Bill was a good
slave under his ownership. William Wilson testified, "I never knew
or heard of said negro Bill to resist or rebel against his owner or any
other person who had authority to control him."" On cross-
examination, Wilson reiterated that Bill was "active, able, and
willing," yet amended "with this exception that he would occasionally
run away."'" 5 Wilson probably lost his value as a plaintiff's witness
when asked, "Had the said Bill the reputation of the Red fox and was
not that reputation acquired by his running away and the difficulty in
his being caught?"'" Wilson answered, "He had the name of the
Red fox and was hard to catch when out."1"7 On re-examination,
the plaintiff-seller's attorney asked Wilson, "Do you not believe the
habit of running away by which Bill acquired the reputation of Red
fox arose from imprudence of the plaintiff by his making unnecessary
threats ... ?"' Wilson explained, "If Bill had belonged to some
persons he would not have run away, and it was well understood that
if he expected to get a whipping beforehand he would leave."1" In
this case, the plaintiff's counsel found himself in the odd position of
arguing that his own client's slave management had been so
deficient-in "making unnecessary threats"-that the slave had run
away from his seller, but that this did not prove he would run away
from his buyer.
Several witnesses testified both that they knew Bill as "Red fox"
because of his skill at evading the slave patrol and that he was an
excellent worker. William Mecham, who described Bill as a "stout,
active and good-looking negro," claimed that he only knew Bill to
have run away once; "one time he came to me one morning and said
his master had got mad with him, he wished me to go home with him
which I did."' 10 Micajah Lisle, who thought Bill a "pert active
negro," also knew of only one runaway episode, when "I came across
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Bill was "in mind and body as far as I know as sound as any
man-black or white."" 2 On cross-examination, Wilson admitted:
"I did know him to run away, I cannot state how often, several times,
one time he went out a horse hunting and staid some time, how long
am unable to say." ' He also said that the name "Red fox" "was
acquired from a race one night with dogs having run well but was
caught.""1 4 However, Wilson concluded that Bill's value was "set
with full knowledge of his character he having worked for me at
harvest ... and a better hand I would never desire."" 5 The plain-
tiff-seller sought to prove that Bill's selling price had already been
discounted for his runaway habit. All of the witnesses were asked to
estimate Bill's value and to explain whether their estimate included
a discount for his "Red fox" reputation.
In this case, the seller argued that Bill ran away only when he was
afraid of being whipped, or when his master acted unreasonably, but
that Bill had a good character. The buyer argued that being a
runaway was Bill's character; Bill was a "Red fox." Many warranty
and hire disputes over runaway slaves hinged on this distinction
between the act of running away and the character or habit of being
a runaway. To some extent, this distinction, particularly as codified
in Louisiana law, amounted to tacit recognition of the area of rights
which slaves had carved out for themselves, and of masters' lack of
absolute control over their slaves. Despite increasingly strict statutory
restrictions on slaves' movements, many slaves continued throughout
the antebellum period to "go abroad" at night, to visit wives on other
plantations, to hire themselves out, and even to live in town apart
from their masters.
Yet the run away/runaway distinction was more than just accom-
modation by whites; it was an effort to define slave character in terms
of habits. If a slave ran away once, it was acceptable to attribute that
action to a rational motive, but if this dangerous habit became
routine, then the slaveholder treated that habit as a vicious character
trait or a disease. Without such a distinction, the comment that
"some months after the said Negroe man had run away he learned
... that the same Negro was a runaway" would make no sense.116
Again, issues of commodification always arose at moments of
character determination. In one Natchez case, Jonathon Guice sued





116. Castellano v. Peillon, Docket #944 (New Orleans ser., May 1824) (available in SCA-
UNO). Appeal reported in 2 Mart. (n.s.) 466 (La. 1824).
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illegally detained from him. 7  Guice's lawyer questioned several
witnesses about the slave, John, asking, "What is his character, was he
in the habit of running away?""18  Holmes's lawyer then cross-inter-
rogated: "What was the value of such boy when addicted to running
away? What is the difference between the value of slaves who are
confirmed runaways and those not having this vice, all other things
being Equal?"" 9  The witnesses all agreed that John had a good
character, that he was not a runaway, and that a runaway was worth
less than half "as he otherwise would be if not a runaway."'"
At trials, witnesses frequently mentioned that a slave had run away
once but called her a good slave at the same time. In Cotton v.
Rogolio, Henry Doyle testified that Captain Samuel Cotton had told
him that Mary "was dissatisfied at living in the county and that she
had run away from Mr. Rogillio .... He also stated that she was
among the best servants he had ever owned."'' James Wallace, a
witness for John Morton in a suit to retrieve damages for a runaway
slave who had been shot in flight, testified that Spencer was "a likely
boy worth twelve or fourteen hundred-never heard anything against
his character except that he had run away.""
C. The Medicalization of Slave Vice: "Habit" and "Disease"
Buyers realized that if a slave's vice was a "habit" akin to a disease,
her status became more like an animal's than it would if her vice was
a purposeful one. Sellers knew that if she was merely the product of
her owner's management, her status was more akin to a child's status.
Both of these conceptions contrast with a conception of immanent
human "character." Belief in either absolute malleability or im-
mutable "addiction" to vice negated the idea that a slave acted out of
the conscious choice of a rational mind or out of the yearnings of a
human soul.1 3
The legal tendency to medicalize slave vice by portraying character
defects as "habits" or "addictions" drew its inspiration from mid-





121. Cotton v. Rogolio, Drawer 202, #143 (Adams County Cir. Ct., Apr. 1837) (available in
HNF).
122. Morton v. Bradley, Bk. 215, Docket #4175 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, June 1857) (available
in ADAH). Appeal reported in 30 Ala. 683 (1857).
123. White supremacists often gave immutable viciousness, or at least underlying savagery,
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nineteenth-century versions of biological racism." Perhaps the
most active expositor of these pseudoscientific theories was Dr.
Samuel Cartwright, who was a physician-witness in slave cases in
Natchez, Mississippi before moving to New Orleans to begin his
better-known career as a medical propagandist for slavery.
Cartwright championed the notion that Negroes were not only
inferior, but were in fact a different, subhuman species. He
propounded what historians have called "states'-rights medicine,"
giving "medical" justification for the Southern way of life."z In a
series of articles in DeBow's Review, Cartwright propounded theories
that interwined polygenesis, the physiological bases of black in-
feriority, and "negro diseases," with physiological causes, behavioral
symptoms, and behavioral and physical cures.
Cartwright located the central difference between blacks and whites
in a complicated feedback system between the nervous system, blood,
and lungs. He postulated, "The great development of the nervous
system... would make the Ethiopian race entirely unmanageable..
. Defective hematosis ... is the true cause of that debasement of
mind which has rendered the people of Africa unable to take care of
themselves."'" Black people, Cartwright contended, rebreathed
their own air, unlike whites:
In bed, when disposing themselves for sleep, the young and old,
male and female, instinctively cover their heads and faces, as if
to insure the inhalation of warm, impure air ... . The natural
effect of the practice is imperfect atmospherization of the
blood-one of the heaviest chains that binds the negro to
slavery.' 27
Blacks needed slavery, Cartwright explained, because they needed
white men's authority to "vitalize and decarbonize their blood by the
process of full and free respiration, that active exercise of some kind
alone can effect."'"
124. See, e.g., Dean v. Traylor, Docket #549 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, Aug. 1849) (available
in GDAH) ("negro consumption"), appeal reported in 8 Ga. 169 (1850); Abbey v. Osborne,
Drawer 275, #52 (Adams County Cir. Ct., Apr. 1839) (available in HNF) ("Strma Africana or
Cachexia or what is sometimes known on the Virginia and Maryland planations as negro
Poison"); Hill v. Winston, Drawer 336, #25 (Adams County Cit. Ct., May 1849) ("negro
syphilis"); Buckner v. Blackwell, Drawer 353, #23 (Adams County Cir. Ct., May 1857) ("cakescia
affrina [sic] or negro consumption").
125. ADVIcE AMONG MASTERS: THE IDEAL IN SLAVE MANAGEMENT IN THE OLD SOUTH
139 (James 0. Breeden ed., 1980).
126. 11 DEBow's REV. 64,184,209,331,504 (1851), reprinted in 2 INDuSTRIAL RESOURCES,
supra note 69, at 318-19, 325.
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Cartwright argued that slaves were medically like children in their
susceptibility to scrofulous diseases; in their anatomy (livers, veins,
sensitive skin); in their fear of the rod; and in the fact that they were
"easily governed by love combined with fear" and "required
government in every thing."" Cartwright also enumerated the
"negro" diseases, including "negro consumption" (what is now known
as "miliary tuberculosis," a deadly form of the disease), and drew a
connection between the physician's diagnostic role with respect to
"negro diseases" and his role in litigation:
It is of importance to know the pathognomonic signs in its early
stages, not only in regard to its treatment, but to detect im-
positions, as negroes afflicted with the complaint are often for
sale; the acceleration of the pulse on exercise incapacitates them
for labor, as they quickly give out and have to leave their work
.... The seat of negro consumption is ... in the mind, and its
cause is generally mismanagement or bad government .... "0
Two other diseases were of paramount importance to these medical
articles for slaveowners: "drapetomania" (the disease of running
away) and "Dysthesia Ethiopica, or Hebetude of Mind" ("what
overseers call Rascality"). Cartwright explained that drapetomania
was caused by masters who did not recognize that negroes are by
nature "knee-benders" from whom "awe and reverence must be
exacted ... or they will despise their masters, become rude and
ungovernable, and run away. '31 Curing drapetomania required
keeping slaves in "that submissive state which it was intended for
them to occupy ... and treat[ing them] like children, with care,
kindness, attention, and humanity."'
According to Cartwright, rascality could also be attributed to lax
management or excess freedom: "Dysthesia Ethiopica... attacks only
such slaves as live like free negroes in regard to diet, drinks, exercise,
etc." ' The proper treatment, in order to stimulate the liver, skin,
and kidneys, was to wash and oil the slave, then to slap his skin with
a broad leather strap and put him to hard work, which would increase
his circulation. Keeping the slave hard at work posed no danger,
because, conveniently, according to nature's laws, it was impossible to
overwork a slave. Cartwright wrote, "A white man, like a blooded
horse, can be worked to death. Not so the negro .... The white
129. Id.
130. Id. at 320, 323.
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men of America have performed many prodigies, but they have never
yet been able to make a negro overwork himsel '"' 4
Some historians view Samuel Cartwright as a marginal thinker in
the American South, whose ideas were accepted only on the fringe.
William Stanton dismisses Cartwright as "that brutal Louisiana
physician and publicist... with his banana-skin humor, who appeared
only on the periphery of the controversy to comment, cheer, or make
impolite noises of disapproval."'35 This viewpoint is valid only with
respect to Cartwright's theories on polygenesis. Few Southerners
accepted Cartwright's attempt to reconcile the separate origins of
blacks with the Bible by arguing that Eve was tempted in the Garden
of Eden not by a serpent but by a "negro gardener," and few believed
that blacks outside slavery were slaves to a serpent/Satan. 13 6  The
idea that "distinctive peculiarities and diseases of the Negro race"
existed was far more widespread. Articles by other authors appeared
not only in DeBow's, but also in several other Southern
periodicals."' The existence of the links between body and
behavior was widely accepted by antebellum Southerners. While few
Southerners may have used the technical term of "drapetomania,"
they did refer to "cachexia africana" (dirt eating) and "other negro
diseases" in court and discussed running away and other slave
behaviors in terms of "addiction" and "habit."
For example, the Louisiana Civil Code labeled theft as an "ad-
diction" and running away as a "habit."'38 Thus, to prove a slave
a runaway or a thief, it was necessary to prove that this "condition"
was long standing and had manifested itself a certain number of times
for a given duration.'39 The fact that Louisiana was the only state
to codify slave vices of character might explain its impulse to reduce
moral qualities to medical bases. Certainly, this tendency had the
134. Samuel Cartwright, Negro Freedom an Impossibility, 30 DEBOw'S REV. 648,651 (1861).
135. WILLIAM STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATnTUDES TOWARD RACE
IN AMERICA, 1815-1859, at vii (1960).
136. See Cartwright, Negro Freedom an Impossibility, supra note 134; Samuel Cartwright,
Unity of Human Race Disproved, 29 DEBOw'S REV. 129 (1860); and the responses to it: Dr.
Cartwright on the Serpent the Ape and the Negro, 31 DEBoW'S REV. 507 (1861); Dr. Cartwright
Reviewed-The Negro, Ape and Serpent, 32 DEBOW'S REV. 238 (1861); Dr. Cartwright on the
Negro, Reviewed, 32 DEBOW'S REV. 54 (1861); Dr. Cartwright on the Negro-Reviewed, 33
DEBOW'S REV. 62 (1861).
137. See, e.g., A.P. Merrill, Plantation Hygiene, 1 S. AGRICULTURIST 267 (1851); J.S. Wilson,
Peculiarities and Diseases of Negroes, 28 DEBOw'S REV. 597 (1860); see generally TODD L.
SAvrrr, MEDICINE AND SLAVERY: THE DISEASES AND HEALTH CARE OF BLACKS IN
ANTEBELLUM VIRGINIA 1-184 (1978) (citing numerous articles by Southerners on black medical
distinctiveness).
138. LA. CIV. CODE, Bk. III, Tit. 7, Chap. 6, § 3, art. 2505 (1824) (repealed).
139. "The slave shall be considered as being in the habit of running away, when he shall
have absented himself from his master's house twice for several days, or once for more than a
month." Id. The statutory rule was varied by case law when a slave was new to the state. See
generally Schafer, supra note 2.
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effect of reducing slaves to something more animal than human. Yet
the description of running away or other vices (such as theft or
disobedience) as "characters," "habits" or "addictions" was also
widespread in other states.14° It was common to characterize slaves
with the phrase, "his habits were very bad., 141
D. The Medicalization of Slave Vice: Madwomen and Idiots
The tendency to treat moral questions as medical ones seems to
have been even stronger when the slave at issue was a woman. There
was no female "Nat" in the Southern lexicon. A woman's resistance
or refusal to work did not conjure the same fears in the white mind
as did a black man's rebellion. In court, buyers or hirers of runaway
women were more likely to question their sanity or mental capacity
than their character.
Historians have long noted the nineteenth-century tendency to
associate women with madness, but this has been considered a largely
middle-class Victorian phenomenon-neurasthenic ladies at New
England spas. Yet, in the slave trials, the same assumptions about
mental instability suggest that gender narratives of insanity may have
been even more widespread than previously realized, although their
implications for black women were very different. The fact that most
runaway women who became the object of warranty suits were house
servants is also noteworthy. One explanation for this may be that
white Southerners were trying to maintain their image of "Mammy,"
and rebellious behavior lay too far outside of that image to be
reconciled with it. Ultimately, though, placing black women's
behavior in a medical framework reinforced their dishonor in white
Southern ideology.
On January 3, 1834, Rose Icar, a New Orleans "free woman of
color," bought Kate, a twenty-year-old slave, from Anthony Abraham
Suares.142 Icar paid $500 in cash for her slave and, by all accounts,
bought Kate for her labor, not to grant her freedom. Less than one
140. See, e.g., Mizell v. Sims, 39 Miss. 331, 333 (1860) (comparing "not a runaway nor in the
habit of running away" and "a habitual runaway"); Ward v. Reynolds, Bk. 221, Docket #4181
(Perry County Cir. Ct., Jan. 1858) (available in ADAH) (noting "addictedness to running
away"); James v. Kirk, Drawer 348, #55 (Adams County Ct., May 1853) (available in HNF),
appeal reported in 29 Miss. 206 (1855) (discussing "the character of a runaway" and "the habit
of running away").
141. See, eg., Tull v. Walker, Drawer 70, #2744 (Adams County Ct., 1830) (available in
HNF); Campbell v. Kinloch (City Ct. of Charleston, Fall 1857) (available in SCDAH).
142. Suares v. Icar, Docket #2649 (New Orleans ser., Jan. 1835) (available in SCA-UNO).
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month later, Icar was in District Court, suing Suares for selling her a
runaway. Her petition to the Court complained that "three or four
days after the said slave had been taken possession of ... it was
discovered that said Slave was crazy, and she also ran away from her
new mistress."143 The witnesses for the plaintiff all described Kate's
"craziness" in terms that raise the possibility that she was as sane as
a slave could be, rationally resisting her position. Jean Dinot testified:
[S]aid Slave is not worth much. When she is asked to fetch one
thing she fetches another .... She is capable of setting fire to [a
house], as she does not know what she is about .... Witness has
seen said Slave when sent by her mistress go away in quite a
different direction talking to herself and gesticulating. Witness
on one occcasion met her going toward the Lake and asked her
where she was going when she answered she did not know.144
On cross-examination, Dinot admitted that he had seen Kate only
three times before appearing in court, and revealed another important
fact: Kate spoke only English. Dinot did not know whether Rose
Icar, a French speaker, spoke or understood English.
Kate ran away but did not get far before being caught and brought
to the police jail of Jefferson, a neighboring parish. She managed to
frustrate her jailor as well; she told him that she belonged to a Doctor
Sealden. He asked where this doctor lived, and she told him, "Down
there, down that Street."4 He was unable to extract any more
information from her and concluded that "said slave is not of sound
mind."''" The Sheriff testified that he had seen Kate "act as a crazy
person-she holloed danced all night and could hardly answer when
spoken to."' 47 Although he threatened her often to be quiet, "the
threats availed nothing," which led him to "the opinion that said Kate
was crazy."148
TWo other witnesses reached the same conclusion. One based his
diagnosis on the fact that "[s]he is of no use in a house-when her
mistress told her to do one thing she did another."'49 However, he
also noted that Rose Icar spoke only a few words of English. On
cross-examination, the witness testified that "when the Plaintiff told
the slave Kate to do any work she spoke to her in English in the best
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"[w]itness was present when Plaintiff told said slave to go and wash
her clothes. She took her clothes and went out of the House and ran
away."15
1
By contrast, the only defense witness told the court that when Rose
Icar had "informed [him] that Kate had absconded... [he] observed
to her that inasmuch as the Slave was a stranger and unacquainted
with the city, it was probable that she had lost her way, and that no
doubt she had been taken up and put in jail. ' ".2 When he suggested
that Kate might be found at the Jefferson Parish jail, Icar told him
that it was up to Mr. Suares to hunt for her. However, the witness
noted that
in none of the conversations which Witness had with the Plaintiff
in relation to this Slave, did she allege the slave to be crazy; that
during the whole time the Slave was under the superintendence
of the Witness, he observed nothing in her behaviour to induce
him to believe that she laboured under any.., derangement.'53
The trial court judge granted Icar a rescission of the sale, finding
Kate to be a habitual runaway. The judge applied the January 1834
Act of the Louisiana Legislature which created the presumption that
a newly imported slave who ran away within two months after sale
had the redhibitory vice of running away at the time of the sale.
Furthermore, the judge ruled that "the evidence of a personal
inspection of the Slave satisfy the Court that the Slave is... destitute
of mental capacity."'"M Suares appealed on the ground that neither
Kate's running away nor her craziness was sufficiently established;
"the utmost that can be inferred from the testimony is that she was
rather stupid: this is an apparent defect, if a redhibitory defect at all
.... ,"11 Suares also complained that the judge had erred in basing
his judgment on his own impression of the slave. The state Supreme
Court was "satisfied from the evidence in the record, independently
of the impression made on the mind of the judge, by personal
inspection, that the slave in question was wholly, and perhaps worse
than useless.'
Kate acted as though she did not understand her French mistress
of color when the mistress spoke English. She disobeyed orders,
avoided work, tried to escape, and lied to her jailers. This behavior
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the judge, that Kate was crazy. If we compare her behavior to that
of the runaway male slaves who stood trial in similar cases, their
"vicious-ness" and her "craziness" are difficult to distinguish. If Kate
had been a man, her refusal to take orders and her efforts to escape
might have been seen as rebellion, and her drinking might have been
emphasized more as evidence of intractable vice. But, as a woman,
vices of "moral qualities" were not applied to her; her actions did not
instill a fear of violent rebellion in whites. Lacking another
explanation for Kate's actions, the court found that her insubor-
dination was lunacy.
Other cases involving female slaves' "craziness" or "idiocy" bear
striking similarities to cases in which male slaves were accused of vice.
For example, witnesses for the buyer of the slave Melly testified that
she whistled after answering any question put to her by a white
person; that she was "much whipmarked and ... did not seem to
enjoy senses enough for common purposes"; and that she seemed to
be an "imbecile." ' 7  However, defense witnesses found Melly to
have "common sense enough for a field hand"; "she did like any
other person she did her work well and obeyed well orders"; and they
commented that, although Melly talked to herself, "white persons are
more apt to speak to themselves than negroes," so that could hardly
be a sign of idiocy!158 In deciding a similar case, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in ruling that idiocy was an apparent vice, vented
frustration with deciding questions of slaves' minds and morals: "It is
very difficult, if not nearly impossible, to fix a standard of intellect by
which slaves are to be judged."'59
In another Louisiana case, Buhler v. McHatton," the buyer,
Buhler, tried to have the sale set aside on two counts: first, "because
said Jane has proved entirely useless as a cook"; and second, "because
157. Chapuis v. Schmelger, Docket #2328 (New Orleans ser., Dec. 1851) (available in SCA-
UNO).
158. Id.
159. Briant v. Marsh, 19 La. 391, 392 (1841). See also Nelson v. Biggers, Docket #428 (Ga.
Sup. Ct., n.d.) (available in GDAH) (describing breach of warranty for "Betty, from imbecility
of mind.. . a slave incapable of performing ordinary work and labor"). Witnesses for the buyer
in Nelson testified that the seller had said that Betty "had not sense to raise her child and they
took it from her and raised it in the house for she had overlaid her first one"; Osborn Unchurch,
the buyer's overseer, "put her Betty to dropping corn and she could not do it for she had to be
shown the place to drop and I put her to cover corn with manure and she did not have sense
to do that." However, the seller's witness, James Heagans, testified that, while Betty was not
"as bright as some negroes," she was capable of the ordinary work of field hands. Id. The
lower court judge excluded this testimony; the buyer won. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme
Court found error in the interpretation of the word "healthy" in the warranty as applying to
"mind" as well as "body," and reversed. Id.
160. Docket #3448 (New Orleans ser., Mar. 1854) (available in SCA-UNO). Appeal
reported in 9 La. Ann. 192 (1854).
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she is addicted to madness.' 161 Buhler tried to show Jane's insanity
with evidence of her burning up her clothes, an "act utterly irrecon-
cilable with the idea of deception," refusing to eat meat on Friday or
Saturday, and "frequent paroxysms of weeping, superstition, and
violence."' 62 Witnesses ascribed Jane's odd behavior to "religious
enthusiasm and grief at being separated from her children."'"
Buhler characterized her "weeping and lamenting a separation of
children" as "superstitious monomania. "" The jury, unimpressed,
found for the seller, McHatton. Justice Campbell, in affirming the
lower court judgment, noted that Jane's behavior "did not attract
particular attention, and was not noticed for a month or more," and
attributed it to her "religious scruples."" s
In one of his briefs, an attorney gave a particularly revealing
treatment of the impossibility of an enslaved woman taking moral
action or having moral dilemmas. In Walker v. Hayes,"6 the slave
had drowned herself and her child soon after being sold. The seller's
witness, J. D. Hair, called Agnes "a girl of unusual good sense," and
the jury gave a judgment for the seller. 67 On appeal, the buyer's
attorney argued that the very fact that Agnes had committed suicide
proved that she was "addicted to madness."'" He went on to
consider all the rational reasons why a person might commit suicide
and concluded that none of them could apply to an enslaved woman:
When [suicide] is done to avoid disgrace by the man sensitive
about his honor, or in accordance with the prevailing custom of
a people, whose minds are darkened by superstition or when it
is done from motives of patriotism to retrieve a nation's honor,
or rescue it from ruin, or in despair of the liberties of one's
country, or to avoid a more cruel fate, in a death of torture, as
illustrated by the heroes of antiquity, rendered immortal by their
wisdom and their valor; it is not for a moment contended that it
proceeds from insanity.
But how different all these classes of suicide from the one for
our consideration: here is a poor slave [with] no patriotic designs
or interests to subserve, no national custom to conform to, no
161. Id.
162. Id. Cf. Council of Charleston v. Solomon Cohen Jr. (City Ct. of Charleston, Oct. 1843)
(available in SCDAH) (recovering cost of housing slave Bella at Poor House "as a maniac
dangerous to the neighborhood by a habit she had of throwing pieces of fire about the room").
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 9 La. Ann. 192 (1854).
166. Docket #6606 (New Orleans ser., n.d.) (available in SCA-UNO). Appeal reported in
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disgrace to avoid, no terrible punishment to escape, buries herself
and helpless child in a common grave .... 169
In other words, an enslaved woman could have no honor: no nation,
no tradition, no courage. The only possible reason that she could
take her life was insanity.
III. OPENING PANDORA'S Box
A. Slave Agency
All of the explanations of slave character and behavior outlined in
Part II-as functions of slave management, as immutable vice, as
habit or disease-operated in some way to remove agency from
enslaved people. Reports of slaves who took action such as running
away on their own impetus and for their own rational reasons fit
uneasily into these accounts. Yet because slaves did behave as moral
agents, reports of their resistant acts persistently cropped up in court.
At times, witnesses provided evidence of slaves acting as moral
agents; at times, the nature of the case required explicit recognition
of slaves' moral agency; at times, it was necessary to rely on slaves'
own words. Occasionally the courts explicitly recognized slaves'
human motivations as the cause of "vices." More often, these stories
appeared in the trial transcripts but were weeded out of the appellate
opinions. Just as judges were reluctant to recognize slaves' skills and
abilities, they feared giving legal recognition to slaves as moral agents
with volition, except when doing so suited very specific arguments or
liability rules. Recognizing slave agency threatened the property
regime both because it undermined an ideology based on white
masters' control and because it violated the tenets of racism which
undergirded Southern plantation slavery in its last decades.
For example, in one Louisiana case, a witness for the plaintiff-seller,
while testifying that the slave Caleb was "punctiliously honest and
trustworthy," explained that he had never heard of "Caleb absenting
himself from the plantation but once, there being no white persons on
the plantation he and his wife had a quarrel and he (Caleb) was out,
I believe all night."'7 Another witness testified to a conversation
in which the slave seller explained that although the slave had run
away four or five times, "it was generally for the fear of being
whipped."'' The appellate court referred to the latter comment,
169. Id.
170. Thomas v. Selser, Docket #4774 (New Orleans ser., Mar. 1842) (available in SCA-
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but not to the former. If a slave ran away for fear of being whipped,
it suggested a mechanical reaction to stimuli within a master's control;
fear of whipping could easily be integrated into a theory of vice as a
function of slave management. However, running away because of a
quarrel with one's spouse connoted a slave's control over his own
family life and his own decision making, interpretations which fit
poorly into accepted theories of slave behavior.
In Reynolds v. White,"r the buyer-plaintiff complained that Sam
was a runaway and a thief; his witness, George Malcolm, testified that
Sam "stay[ed] away sometimes one day, sometimes more" and that
"plaintiff was obliged to tie up said boy and nail up his gates to keep
him at home."1" On the other hand, White's witness, C. J. Cook,
knew Sam to be "absent" only once when White owned him:
To wit; the boy's mother was sick and the physician left a
prescription for her; the boy was sent out with other prescription
to the Druggists after candlelight that boy did not return for 24
or 48 hours ... and Mr. White and family thought the boy was
lost and witness was of the same opinion. The boy was in the
constant habit of getting out to play whenever he could and
would return.174
Cook did not consider this "play" to be running away.1 75
Similarly, in Anderson v. Dacosta, a witness for Mathilda's seller
described her as one who "liked to play and amuse herself" but
nevertheless "bore a good name and character and was of a mild
disposition."'76 Another witness who spoke well of Mathilda denied
that she was a runaway, explaining that she was only "in the habit of
going back to the places where she was hired before," and that "all
she wanted was a master to look to her and not to allow her
privileges to run about."" In both of these cases, several witnesses
for the sellers, rather than arguing that new masters bore respon-
sibility for slaves' character, suggested that they ran away for their
own reasons-to return to former owners, possibly to see family
members, or even out of playfulness. Of course, this evidence of
slave agency could shade into an argument that stronger discipline
could prevent its exercise.
At the level of witness testimony, hire cases often brought forth
evidence of enslaved persons acting of their own volition. For
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example, one owner sued a railroad for taking his hired slave to
Brunswick, when he had been hired to work closer to home.178 The
railroad's lawyer posed cross-interogatories to a witness so as to
suggest that the change in work assignment came of the slave's own
volition, not of the railroad's needs:
Do you know defendant carried said negro to Brunswick? Did
not the negro run away and go towards Brunswick? Did defen-
dant ask leave to carry said negro to Brunswick, or did he not
say to you that the negro wanted to go there. And did he not
tell you that he ran away?"7
The witness replied, "I do not recollect that he said the negro wanted
to go. After the negroes death Deft said something in regard to the
negroes having become attached to some of the negro women that
went to Brunswick and this being a reason why the negro went off
with them .... "80
Witnesses often presented evidence of slaves trying to go back to
former masters or, when hired out, to their present owners, making
it difficult for the court to deny some semblance of slave agency.181
Judge Hackleman sold a slave
because he said he wanted another master-said he thought he
ought to be allowed to go to preaching when he wanted to. He
ran away from witness once. Got dogs and caught him. Told
him I would whip him if he did not finish his task the day
before-He did quite finish it and went off."
Another slave ran away because, one witness reported, "he did not
wish to go to Texas."" a  Mary, a Natchez slave, ran away because
she "was dissatisfied at living in the country," although she had been
purchased "to satisfy a negro boy.., named Henry who wanted her
for a wife.' ' s4 Mary reported to a witness that she had "taken some
178. Collins v. Lester, Docket #1349 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, May 1854) (available in
GDAH). Appeal reported in 16 Ga. 410 (1854).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Maury v. Coleman, Bk. 174, Docket #3063, #4 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, Jan.
Term 1854) (available in ADAH); Farmer v. Fiske, Docket #5248 (New Orleans ser., Dec. 1844)
(available in SCA-UNO).
182. Morton v. Bradley, Bk. 215, Docket #4175, #2 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, June Term 1857)
(available in ADAH).
183. Mangham v. Cox, Bk. 1856, Docket #2952, #32 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, 1st Div., June
Term 1856) (available in ADAH); see also Sessions v. Cartwright, Drawer 340, #142 (Adams
County Cir. Ct., Nov. 1851) (available in HNF).
184. Cotton v. Rogolio, Drawer 202, #143 (Adams County Cir. Ct., Apr. 1837) (available in
HNF).
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medicine to clear herself," which he took to mean "thereby to produce
abortion."' '
Abram Martin sued Charles Bosley when they could not agree on
how to divide a lot of slaves they had bought together."8 5 According
to a witness present at the "divition," two slaves asserted their own,
contradictory preferences for the transaction:
The fellow said if he was parted from [a certain woman slave] he
would destroy himself he further observed that if he did not get
her for a wife he would destroy the girl or himself and the girl
would not live with him or have him for a husband and they
were then parted and had been parted for the [voyage].1 7
Slaves who influenced their own sale, hire, or other disposition
compromised their own commodification. Any risky venture might
introduce unreliability into a transaction. But slaves were different
from other risky investments because slaves themselves could increase
or decrease their own value. Testimony about the role of slaves'
volition in slave transactions extended their influence into the legal
arena.
The Louisiana Supreme Court was the only Deep South court that
occasionally accepted evidence openly of slaves' own motivations to
explain their running away. This was probably because Louisiana had
such strict codified parameters for the "habit of running away"-up
to a certain point, a slave's behavior might be only "petit marronage"
("little running away"); after that point, the slave was a runaway.
Because the definition of the runaway habit was strictly defined in the
Louisiana Civil Code, judges were more able to recognize a slave's
personhood when his or her behavior fell outside the strict
definition. 1" For example, the New Orleans parish court did not
consider that a slave's running away to visit his wife made him a
"runaway."'" Ludger Fortier sued for the rescission of a slave sale
because the slave left three days after the sale for several hours.
185. Id.
186. Martin v. Bosley, Drawer 49, Folder 3E (Adams County Ct. [Miss. Terr.], 1805)
(available in HNF).
187. Id.
188. This seems to be an unusual twist on the perennial "rules vs. standards" debate-an
instance where a rule gives more leeway than a standard. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
189. Fortier v. LaBranche, Docket #3289 (New Orleans ser., June 1839) (available in SCA-
UNO). Appeal reported in 13 La. 355 (1839). Similarly, a slave buyer was denied rescission
of the sale when the court found that the slave had only been returning (twice) to his former
owner's plantation to see his wife. Smith v. McDowell, Docket #4431 (New Orleans ser., n.d.)
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According to defense witnesses, the slave had a good character and
had run away only to visit a slave woman on a neighboring plantation.
The court denied Fortier's claim, finding that "Negroes sometimes
absent themselves from their masters in the night without being
runaway." Similarly, in Bocod v. Jacobs, the Supreme Court noted
that a slave's running away "may be the consequence of the
displeasure of being sold--of his dislike of the new owner."'' In
Nott v. Botts, the trial judge found "nothing extraordinary in the fact
of a negro coming from Kentucky, where they are treated almost on
an equality with their master, running away in Louisiana," implying
a slave's desire for greater autonomy."' All of these charac-
terizations of slave motivation aver reasons that are rational, not
products of mismanagement, "disease," or immutable viciousness.
The fact that Louisiana's definition of a "runaway" led to greater
recognition of slaves' human agency had ramifications for litigants of
nearby states. One Mississippi case became a referendum on the
applicability of Louisiana law to local conditions. In 1848, John D.
James, a Natchez and New Orleans slave trader, sold nine slaves to
Joseph J. B. Kirk, a horse trader."9 It is unclear whether the sale
took place in Louisiana or Mississippi; the complaint refers to a sale
"at the Parish of Point Coupee and state of Louisiana, to wit, at the
County of Adams.""' In any event, in 1849, Kirk filed suit against
James on the basis of James's warranty executed under Louisiana law,
stating that "said Slaves were free from the redhibitory vices and
diseases."' 94 Kirk complained that one of the slaves, Simon, had run
away repeatedly and had finally drowned in an escape attempt)95
Both James and Kirk asked for jury instructions based on Louisiana
law. Judge Posey refused to give several of James's instructions but
did explain the Louisiana Code regarding redhibition to the jury.
190. Bocod v. Jacobs, 2 La. 408, 410 (1831).
191. Nott v. Botts, Docket #3123, (New Orleans ser., Mar. 1839) (available in SCA-UNO).
Appeal reported in 13 La. 202 (1839).
192. Kirk v. James, Docket #7049, Drawer 348 (Adams County Cir. Ct., Apr. 1855)
(available in HNF). Appeal reported in James v. Kirk, 29 Miss. 206 (1855). James's trading
business had him in the courts often; he defended three suits for breach of warranty in the
Adams County Circuit Court in 1851-52 alone. Ayres v. James, Drawer 338, #171 (Adams
County Cir. Ct., May 1851) (available in HNF); Kirkland v. James, Drawer 322, # 191 (Adams
County Cir. Ct., May 1852) (available in HNF); McCrain v. Hames, Drawer 336, #136 (Adams
County Cir. Ct., May 1852) (available in HNF).
193. Id.
194. Kirk v. James, Docket #7049, Drawer 348 (Adams County Cir. Ct., Apr. 1855)
(available in HNF).
195. Four juries heard Kirk's suit. The first jury found for James, and Kirk was granted a
new trial; two successive trials ended in mistrial. In 1853, the fourth jury found for Kirk, and
Judge Stanhope Posey overruled James's motion for a new trial. James then lost his appeal to
the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals. Kirk v. James, Docket #7049, Drawer 348
(Adams County Cir. Ct., Apr. 1855) (available in HNF).
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James appealed the lower court's decision on the ground that the jury
had applied an "arbitrary rule of evidence of another state."' 96 He
argued that Louisiana was traveling down a slippery slope towards
recognition of slaves' personhood and protection of slave buyers that
Mississippi should not follow. He stated, "For illustration, suppose
that by the laws of Louisiana negro slaves are competent witnesses to
prove the vice in a companion .... "" Admitting slave testimony,
argued James, was equally as outrageous as warranting that a slave
would not run away. 98
James's argument about the dangers of accepting Louisiana's
protections for slave buyers in Mississippi reveals general fears about
the slippery slope of implied warranty. While a buyer's rule that
strictly codified vices as "habits" made it possible to treat slaves as
subhuman, buyers' further claims about slaves' human agency
threatened a law of sales in which slaves were property only.
Judges resisted extending protections to buyers because they did
not want to open the "Pandora's box" of putting slave character on
trial. Going to trial risked long, involved proceedings (and possible
hung juries) on the question of masters' treatment of slaves. In James
v. Kirk, 9 the testimony dwelt on whether a master was "as good a
disciplinarian ... as any of his neighbours."" Other cases put
masters' character on trial in other ways-for example, by judging
slaveholders' savviness in the marketplace. Because these market
transactions were risky, and slaveholders became personally invested
in the outcome, slaves had the most potential to influence the deals
by their behavior.
Judges outside of Louisiana conceded slave agency most directly in
tort cases, where a slaveholder sued another for damage to a slave
when under the defendant's control. Most commonly, the defendant
in these cases was an industrial hirer, or a common carrier, usually a
ferryboat operator. Common carriers were generally held responsible
for damages to property on board, so they usually insured themselves
against such damage. In Trapier v. Avant,2°t a judge tackled the
question of "whether negroes, being the property damaged, they
196. Kirk v. James, 29 Miss. 206, 208 (1855).
197. Id.
198. Justice Handy was unmoved, affirming the lower court judgment. In this case, he ruled,
the Louisiana rules were not mere evidentiary regulations unenforceable in Mississippi; they
were express stipulations of the contract itself. Id. at 211.
199. Docket #7049, Drawer 348 (Adams County Cir. Ct., Apr. 1855) (available in HNF).
200. Id.
201. Box 21 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Records, 1827) (available in SCDAH). Trapier's slaves drowned
crossing in Avant's ferry; disputed facts included whether or not crossing in a paddle-boat rather
than a "flat" was contrary to custom, and whether or not Avant's ferryman had been negligent,
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should form an exception to the general rule of liability in the
carrier."' The court determined that slaves were not an exception.
"Negroes have volition, and may do wrong; they also have reason and
instinct to take care of themselves. As a general rule, human beings
are the safest cargo, because they do take care of themselves."'
According to the judge, however, the humanity of the slaves did not
present enough of a problem to alter the general property rule. "Did
this quality, humanity, cause their death? Certainly not-what was the
cause? The upsetting of the boat. Who is liable fore the upsetting of
the boat? The ferriman; there is an end of the question."'
The dissenting judge, however, pointed out the problem created by
slaves' human agency: if the slaves had run away or thrown themsel-
ves overboard before the ferryman had a chance to reach them, then
holding Avant responsible would amount to converting his contract
into a guarantee of the slaves' "good morals and good sense."2 5 To
Judge Johnson, the dissenter, slaves' humanity-their desire to escape
and even to commit suicide-prevented the application of the usual
liability rule. He explained:
These people like ourselves possess volition and physical powers
which nothing short of the [illegible] can contain. Fetters may
restrain their physical powers and the [illegible] may suppress the
visible emotions of the will. But these restraints once removed,
nothing short of omnipotence can infallibly circumscribe or put
bounds to their powers .....
Thus, both the majority and the dissent based their opinions about
the applicability of a general liability rule to slaves on considerations
of slaves' moral agency. In the tort case, unlike a breach of warranty
case, judges found it impossible to deny that slaves were intervening
actors in the causal chain. However, unlike the criminal law, which
explicitly treated slaves as people so that they could be punished for
crimes against whites, tort law resisted altering its rules for slave
property. Torts pushed the logic of the black slave's dependent
character to its outer limit: the position that won out in this case




205. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
207. For a useful discussion of the application of another tort liability rule to slaves, the
fellow-servant rule, see Paul Finkelman, Northern Labor Law and Southern Slave Law: The
Application of the Fellow Servant Rule to Slaves, 11 NAT'L BLACK U. 212 (1989). Finkelman
argues that it was precisely because of the limits on slaves' agency--in this case, their inability
to avoid dangerous work conditions-that Southern courts refused to apply this rule to slaves.
40
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol7/iss2/2
Gross
Another boat case illustrates the Avant dissent's position that
whites could not be held responsible for actions taken by enslaved
blacks of their own "free will." In Gorman v. Campbell,2 where
a slave drowned while working as a hired boathand, the ferry owner
claimed that it was the slave's own fault that he died. Gorman, the
slave owner, claimed that the boat owner must be held liable because
he was responsible for the slave and had improperly employed him in
clearing the river of logs. Richard Bishop, testifying for Gorman,
stated:
It is not the custom of the... rivers to employ negroes hired for
Boat Hands in clearing obstructions from the river or opening
new passages for the Boats [added later] unless it is unavoidable
at the time or necessary .... The boy Sam of his own accord,
in presence of the captain went into the river and commenced
cutting a log. That he was about half an hour cutting the log in
two-and the captain present during the time-that the water
was very swift at the place he was cutting, and when he had cut
the log-to save himself from being carried down stream he
jumped upon another log which projected into the water, but
which gave way and was carried down stream by the current with
the boy on it-that in floating down his hat fell off and in
endeavoring to recover it, he sank suddenly, and was soon found,
a short distance below .... 29
The captain and engineer of the boat testified that "the boy...
was not drowned from the improper management of the owners of
the Boat-Express orders being given by the witnesses for the negroes
to engage in the work of choosing the river., 21' The court charged
the jury that if they believed the negro was engaged in the work of his
own free will, the boat owner was not liable. The jury found for the
boat owner. The plaintiff appealed on the ground that the court's
instructions amounted to a statement "[t]hat it was not necessary to
use coercion with this kind of property. '21' The plaintiff clearly
understood that recognizing a slave's agency threatened the bonds of
slavery.212
208. Docket #1175 (Ga. Sup. CL Records, June 1853) (availabe in GDAH). Appeal
reported in 14 Ga. 137 (1853).
209. Id. In the trial records, the slave's name appears as both "Sam" and "Landon"; in the
supreme court report, it is reprinted as "London."
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. The Georgia Supreme Court, in an opinion by Judge Lumpkin, overturned the lower
court verdict, finding for the slave owner. Gorman v. Campbell, 14 Ga. 137 (1853). See
Finkelman, supra note 130, at 230; see also Horlbeck v. Erickson, 39 S.C.L. (6 Rich.) 154, 158
(S.C. 1852) ("The slave being a moral agent, and having volition, adventured from the impulses
of his nature. . . "); Wilder v. Richardson, 23 S.C.L. (Dudley) 323, 324 (1838) ("To run away
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In effect, not recognizing slaves as agents with free will meant
holding all supervisors of slaves strictly liable for their character and
behavior; recognizing slaves as agents, conversely, meant that
supervisors were not required to "use coercion" to compel slaves'
behavior. The first option created the equivalent of a warranty of
moral qualities in the tort context, with all of its attendant difficul-
ties-the second option threatened anarchy.
On the other hand, judges in hire disputes frequently used legal
analogies to horses or real estate, which minimized the person/thing
distinction and de-emphasized slaves as moral agents. 23  This may
be because suits over hiring fell under the law of bailment, or rental
property, which meant that these cases aligned slaves more closely
with real property, especially real estate. Courts compared a slave
falling ill or running away during the hire term to "the loss of the
house by fire"; 214 they compared the injunction not to treat a hired
slave cruelly to the requirement that "after [a hired horse] is
exhausted, and has refused its feed, the hirer is bound not to use
it."" 5 By abstracting claims about slaves to general property claims,
judges made it possible to think of slaves less as human agents and
more as things.
B. Trickery
To whites, the worst part about slaves' acting for themselves was
the possibility that they might deceive their masters through such
actions. Slaveholders were constantly on the lookout for slaves'
trickery, and their fear lent greater urgency to the project of proper
slave "management." A master who could not read slaves well ran
the risk of being duped by them, and nothing was less honorable than
being fooled by a slave.
The most common mention of a slave's deceit was to characterize
a slave as feigning illness, "lazy.. . and affected to be sick," '216 when
in fact "little was there and then the matter with him, the said slave,
Supreme Court revolved around the hiring of slaves.
213. I found no instances of parties in the courtroom explicitly comparing slaves to animals,
although very occasionally a party cited cases involving unsound pigs or horses to bolster his
legal argument. See, eg., Barnes v. Blair, 16 Ala. 71,72 (1849) (citing horse cases); Scarborough
v. Reynolds, 46 S.C.L. (13 Rich.) 98 (S.C. 1860) (plaintiff arguing that slave with crooked arm
was unsound, citing cases in which lame horses were ruled unsound).
214. Outlaw v. Cook, Minor 257, 257-58 (Ala. 1824).
215. Hogan v. Carr, 6 Ala. 471, 472 (1844). See also Mayor of Columbus v. Howard, 6 Ga.
213, 219 (1849) ("If a man hires a horse, he is bound to ride it moderately."); John E. Stealey,
The Responsibilities and Liabilities of the Bailee of Slave Labor in Virginia, 12 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 336 (1968).
216. Cozzins v. Whitacker, Bk. 34, Docket #1261 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, Jan. Term 1833)
(available in ADAH).
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and only needed whipping to make him work well., 217  Hardy
Stevenson complained that he had only bought the slave Esther
because "the defendant represented said slave to be sound and to be
deceitful in pretending to be sick frequently and.., said all that she
needed was a master who would drive her., 2 8 Doctors sometimes
told a slave's master that a slave was "practicing a deception on the
family ... and treated her accordingly. 21 9 One doctor, who sold an
old woman slave as sound, told the buyer that "she complained of
being sick but that she was able to do the house work."2' Her
former owner also testified at the trial that although Fanny
complained of rheumatism, "it was more from an unwillingness to
work than from want of ability.""2  Slaveholders constantly feared
that slaves were feigning illness or otherwise trying to manipulate
their masters; a good master was one who could see through this
deceit and make a slave work.
Slaves could feign insanity by putting on fake fits or acting as
though they could not understand what was said to them. The stories
of deceitful pretense of insanity mirror the same fears as those of
feigning physical illness. Even when the parties generally agreed that
a slave was insane, they felt it necessary to point out that her
symptoms were "utterly irreconcilable with the idea of deception."'
In a breach of warranty case for an allegedly insane slave, the seller
often suggested that the insanity was feigned, as did this seller's
lawyer on cross-examination of the buyer's overseer:
What were the symptoms of insanity, if any, which you dis-
covered about the negro Lawson? Were they constantly on him,
or did they return only occasionally? Was not the said Lawson
an artful designing fellow and do you not believe he affected to
be deranged? Do you not remember that he pretended to be in
love, and did he not state that as the cause of his derangement,
and did not the [plaintiff] order him to be whipped saying he
pretended only to be deranged, and that he would whip him out
of his love fit, or words to that effect?m
217. Walton v. Jordan, Docket #2099 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, Mar. 1857) (available in
GDAH). Appeal reported in 23 Ga. 420 (1857).
218. Stevenson v. Reaves, Bk. 171, Docket #4043 (Barbour County Cir. Ct., Jan. 1854)
(available in ADAH). Appeal reported in 24 Ala. 425 (1854).
219. Hopkins v. Tilman, Docket #2268 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, Sept. 1857) (available in
GDAI-I). Appeal reported in 25 Ga. 212, 213 (1858).
220. Laurence v. McFarlane, Docket #1722 (New Orleans ser., Mar. 1829) (available in SCA-
UNO).
221. Id.
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The most terrifying deceit by a slave was not to pretend illness or
even insanity, however, but to pretend to be a white man. This issue
arose in lawsuits by owners against railroads or ferryboats for
transporting runaway slaves. The common carrier's defense was often
that a reasonable person would have taken the slave for a white man.
In one Georgia case, the owner introduced a witness who had seen
Sam in Chicago, "passing as a white-man .... Saw him take drinks
at the bar with white men."' ' Although "to a casual observer," this
witness said, Sam "did not show any negro blood, he shewed [sic] the
negro from the nose down."2" The railroad put on witnesses who
swore that they had seen Sam about [plaintiff's] store for a year
or more and considered him a white man-that they had dealt
with him in the store as a clerk of the [plaintiffs] bought goods
of him and paid him money-that his complexion was light his
hair straight and his general appearance to ordinary observation
that of a white man one offered had been in the habit of calling
him Mr Wallace and regarded him as a member of the firm.22
Thus, witnesses presented evidence of slaves' attempts to subvert
the institution of slavery by avoiding work or escaping through the
use of their own cunning. These subversions may even have been
imagined by slaveholders anxious about their own ability to control
their bondspeople. But the fact that the possibility of deception
lurked behind every case of a "defective" slave thwarted whites'
efforts to turn these cases into exercises of mastery and control. In
particular, that a slave could "pass" as white meant that whites could
imbue "property" with honor and character, albeit by mistake.
C. Slave Testimony
The one area where judges did travel down the slippery slope of
recognizing slaves' personhood was in the acceptance of slaves' own
statements as evidence in the courtroom. It was a cardinal rule of
slave law in every state that slaves could under no circumstances
testify against a white man; this rule applied to out-of-court nonhear-
say as well as live testimony. The rationale for the rule was simple:
slaves were mendacious and unworthy of taking the oath to testify;
their words could not be the basis of liability or culpability of a white
person. Yet, time and again, in warranty cases, a slave's statements
regarding his or her own condition were allowed, almost always
224. Wallace v. Spullock, Docket #3608 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, Dec. 1860) (available in
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against a white man, the slave seller. Thomas Cobb notes in his
treatise that this anomaly represented the primary exception to the
rule, due to "the necessity of the case."'  This mostly happened at
the witness level and passed without judicial comment.
First, it was common for witnesses to refer to slaves' statements in
their testimony without either party objecting. If no party objected,
evidence of the use of slave testimony did not appear in the appellate
opinion. For example, in George v. Bean,2' several witnesses
referred to slave testimony, that "the [slave] girl complained of a pain
in her head and side" and "complained ... of debility ... of being
overcome by hurt."'229 The Mississippi High Court of Errors and
Appeals granted the plaintiff-seller a new trial on other grounds,
never mentioning the admission of slave statements in its opinion.3'
In one South Carolina case, one witness testified that "the Negro
said he had eaten dirt," 1 and another that Romeo "after a
drunking frolic would complain of a stoppage in his water," to which
no one objected. 2  In another case that involved competing
medical testimony, one doctor testified that a slave "said she was
unable to attend to her duties about the house" because of an
"enlargement of the tendons of her ankle." 3  The other doctor,
who argued that the swelling was only mild rheumatism, testified that
"she said she had runaway, and took a cold, and that the swelling
arose from that."'
The reported statements sometimes went beyond mere medical
symptoms. One Natchez witness reported that an enslaved woman
"had a short time before [she was sold] taken some medicine to clear
herself (meaning thereby to produce abortion as this affiant
227. COBB, supra note 1, at 231. Walter Johnson discusses this phenomenon in Louisiana
courts. Johnson, supra note 7, at 233-34.
228. Record Grp. 32, Drawer 105, Docket #7418 (Chickasaw County Cir. Ct., Dec. 1855)
(available in Mississippi Department of Archives & History). Appeal reported in 30 Miss. 147
(1855).
229. Id.
230. 30 Miss. 147 (1855).
231. Brocklebank v. Johnson, Box 28 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Records, Apr. 1834). Appeal reported
in Johnson v. Brocklebank, 2 Hill 353 (S.C. 1834) [no S.C.L. volume available].
232. Id.
233. Dinkins ads. Parkerson, Box 34 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Records, 1839) (available in SCDAH).
234. Id. See also Mangham v. Cox, Bk. 1856, Docket #2952, #32 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, 1st
Div., 1856) (available in ADAH); Feagin v. Beasley, Docket #2126 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, 1857)
(available in GDAH); Dean v. Traylor, Docket #549 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, 1849) (available in
GDAH); Buckner v. Blackwell, Drawer 353, #23 (Adams County Cir. Ct., May Term 1857)
(available in HNF); James v. McCoy, Drawer 344, #69 (Adams County Cir. Ct., May Term 1854)
(available in HNF); Herring v. James, Drawer 329, #169 (Adams County Cir. Ct., May 1847)
(available in HNF); Smith v. Meek, Drawer 232, #76 (Adams County Cir. Ct., Apr. 1838)
(available in HNF); Hillier v. Hume, (no box) (City Ct. of Charleston, 1854) (available in
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understood)."235 Another testified to a slave's statements about his
ownership: "[T]he overseer went with him to the negroe's cabbin
[sic], where he was sick, saw and spoke to [the slave], asked him who
he belonged to, and answered, to Mr Sauve and that said Barnaby
sold him to him .... 236
Even if the opposing party objected to the admission of slaves'
words at trial, often the judge overruled the objection. In Bush v.
Jackson,237 William Murrah's attorney asked Dr. Jesse Peebles about
Phoebe's illness, including the following interrogatories:
11. State what account the negro woman Phoebe gave to you
of the causes and length of her diseased state? How long
she had been laboring under a cough and difficulty of
respiration? Wether she had been cupped blistered or
scarrified and what for? Who had been the physician....
Whether she had ever afterwards felt well? State what she
described her feelings to be and to have been since said
former sickness?
12. State how the symptoms [she] described accorded with
your own opinion.... .3'
Despite the fact that the defendant objected to the eleventh and
twelfth interrogatories "because predicated on the sayings of a slave,"
Dr. Peebles answered the questions.239 In one Mississippi case, Hill
v. Winston,2' the defendant based his motion for a new trial on the
judge's ruling which allowed "so much of the deposition of said
Collins as relates to and is founded upon hearsay and the statements
of the negro Caroline.""2  The judge allowed the jury to hear the
deposition that "the girl Caroline stated that she was sickly and had
been in bad health for several years, and had been sold several times
and taken back," and the jury found for Caroline's buyer. 2
When these cases reached appellate courts, judges invented creative
excuses for what seemed like a giant step out of bounds: first, they
took care of hearsay objections on the grounds that the statements
235. Cotton v. Rogilio, Drawer 202, #143 (Adams County Cir. Ct., Apr. 1837) (available in
HNF).
236. Barnaby v. Tomlinson, Drawer 31 (Adams County Ct. [Miss. Terr.], 1805) (available
in HNF).
237. Bk. 174, No. 14, Docket #4012 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, Jan. 1854) (available in ADAH).
238. Id.
239. Id. See also Tilman v. Stringer, Docket #2486 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Records, 1858) (available
in GDA-1) ("[C]ounsel for defendant objected to the witness' stating any thing as to what the
negro said in regard to her situation and that she complained-in the ground that it was
hearsay-the Court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony... stated that the negro
complained of head ache and said she had pains in her back and side and shoulders . .
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were verbal acts or res gestae. Second, they ruled that since doctors
routinely used slaves' statements about their own condition as criteria
on which to base their medical opinions, such statements could be
admitted in the context of doctors' opinions. Yet, eventually, even
sick slaves' declarations to laymen were allowed. It was impossible
to hear suits about the condition of human beings without hearing
from the human beings themselves.23
The Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals, in Fondren v.
Durfee,24 decreed that a sick slave's declarations to his master
about his present illness were admissible as "verbal acts, indicating the
nature and character of the disease under which the slave is laboring,"
and then arrived at the dubious conclusion that "being made to the
master, who is interested in the welfare of the slave, [the slave's
declarations] are presumed to be honest."'245 This holding was a far
cry from the expectation that a slave will dissemble illness to get out
of work. The court also rationalized the presumption of slaves'
honesty concerning their own health by the fact that slaves'
declarations were "constantly acted upon by medical men as true
statements."m
In Bates v. Eckles & Brown, Dr. Peterson testified, "In conversation
with the negro, I learned from him, although he made the statement
with extreme reluctance, that he had been subject to similar attacks
before .... " Mary Treadwell also explained that Toney
made frequent suggestions as to the treatment to be used, which
led to inquiries on my part, as to whether he had been before
afflicted in the same way. He replied that he had been subject
to similar attacks and had generally been relieved by drinking
soap suds... [and] by being put in a barrel of warm water.'
Sarah Stephens added that she heard Toney "suggest the use of red
pepper, which he generally carried in his pocket .... [H]e often
asked for syrup and said meat would hurt him."'
Despite the defendant-seller's objections to this testimony, the
Alabama Supreme Court, like the Mississippi High Court of Errors
and Appeals, ruled that slaves' declarations "are admissible evidence
upon the principle of res gestae as well as from the necessity of the
243. See Thomas D. Morris, Slaves and the Rules of Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1209 (1993).
244. 39 Miss. 324 (1860).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Bates v. Eckles, Record Bk. 153 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, Jan. 1855) (available in
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case." However, slave statements regarding previous illness
would only be admissible if they had been made to a physician. The
court cautioned that if it went too far in allowing statements as
reported to other witnesses, such as "the female witnesses who
disposed in this case," "it would be an easy matter to prove slaves
unsound by their declarations of their unsoundness, oftentimes
feigned as an excuse to avoid labor, or to procure a change of
masters.""51  The possibility of a false "warranty" coming directly
from a slave increased the risk of a master's investment, and increased
the risk of the master losing his honor and character as a master if he
honored the deceit of the slave.
IV. CONCLUSION
The introduction of slave testimony threatened slavery because it
introduced into the courtroom the specter of the deceitful slave
manipulating whites. The possibility that a slave might deceive one
into believing in his illness, idiocy, or whiteness impugned a white
man's honor in the deepest way. More than any other kind of
dispute, those invoking whites' fear of being tricked by blacks
demonstrate why it cannot be true that "the slaves' influence on sales
law... was akin to that of horses, rather than to that of persons."" 2
Slaves were people, whether or not "the law," as constituted by
legislatures and appellate judges, recognized them as such. As people,
they behaved in ways, consciously and unconsciously, that wreaked
havoc with judges' efforts to treat them as things or horses. If a horse
turned out to be lame or vicious, it did not create a trial scene in
which a man's neighbors came out to accuse him of being unable to
control his plantation.' 3 A horse could not provide a challenge to
a white man's honor.
Furthermore, a horse could not provide a challenge to the system
of slavery the way that a resistant slave could. Runaway slaves forced
conflict to the surface in a variety of ways, from escapes to the North
to mundane disputes. Slave resistance assumed political significance
in Southern courts because this was an arena in which Southerners
250. 26 Ala. at 659.
251. Id. at 660. The Alabama Supreme Court later limited the Bates holding, ruling in
Blackman v. Johnson that a witness could not testify that a slave prayed or called on others to
pray for him as evidence of sickness. Blackman v. Johnson, 35 Ala. 252 (1859); see also Barker
v. Coleman, 35 Ala. 221 (1859); Stringfellow v. Mariott, 11 Ala. 573 (1836) (admitting slave's
declarations to prove scienter on part of vendor).
252. Fede, supra note 2, at 323.
253. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Nelson, Drawer 356, #25 (Adams County Cir. Ct., May 1859)
(available in HNF) (white horse warranted as "sound and gentle" turned out to be "unsound
and scary"); Brown v. Jones, SG 2803 [archive marking], in Misc. Ct. Cases, Briefs, Etc., 1820-
1873 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Records, n.d.) (available in ADAH) (horse warranted sound).
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faced the most difficulty in reconciling slavery with their liberal
institutions. The "tone of desperation" James Oakes found
"hover[ing] over the case law of slavery in the Old South' is
apparent in the appellate decisions of moral qualities warranty cases,
as judges tried to shut Pandora's box.
Parties in court opened Pandora's box when they based their claims
on slaves' moral qualities or volition as moral agents; when their
witnesses testified that slaves took action for their own reasons; or
when those witnesses repeated slaves' own words. Judges, however,
tried to shut Pandora's box by privileging accounts that emphasized
slave behavior as a function of masters' character or management, or
medicalized slave vice into insanity or idiocy. Lawyers and judges
confronted slave resistance by promoting stories about the origins and
development of slave character and behavior that removed rational
agency from slaves. In this way, the law created an image of
blackness as an absence of will, what Patricia Williams has called
,,antiwill., ,25'
Yet reading trial records shows how incomplete a picture of "the
law" appellate opinions provide. If what happened in courtrooms, in
the common experience and consciousness of ordinary people, was
"law"-if "law" is one of the "great cultural formations of human
life"-then it is impossible to pin down one integrated version of "the
good slave" under "the law." 6 Buyers, sellers, hirers, owners, and
overseers all told different stories about why slaves behaved as they
did and had the "character" they had. They drew on images at large
in Southern plantation culture, shaped by shared narratives of race,
gender, and commodification of slaves' character and labor-but they
also refashioned those images for the legal arena, and for their own
advantage at trial. The portrayal of slave character as malleable,
dependent on a master's management, benefited slave sellers and
owners; "medicalizing" slave vices as "habits" or "addictions"
benefited buyers and nonowners who "damaged" slaves.
Because the conflict devolved so often into a debate over mutability
or immutability of character, the focus inevitably shifted from slaves
to masters. Mastery and the character of masters came into question
directly under the dictum of "like master, like man," but indirectly as
well in every decision about a slave's character that reflected in some
way on her master's control, will, or honor. These cases mattered in
254. OAKEs, supra note 18, at 160.
255. WILLIAMs, supra note 13, at 219.
256. GEERTZ, supra note 12, at 219. I accept Geertz's "two propositions, that law is local
knowledge not placeless principle and that it is constructive of social life not reflective, or
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Southern culture precisely because putting black character on trial
also put white character on trial.
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